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Foreword
Statements of tax policy represent a conscientious effort by
the federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate,
develop positions on matters of tax policy covering major areas
of taxation in which members of the accounting profession have
special competence.
The continuing creation of new businesses and the growth of
existing businesses have long been recognized as activities of
social and economic necessity. Existing firms may grow through
internal means, utilizing their own management, employees, and
financial resources. Alternatively, they may achieve such growth
through external means, through acquisition or merger.
The present tax treatment of transactions incident to the for
mation of new corporate businesses and the combination of two
or more businesses contains deficiencies that impede the proper
functioning of these activities within the socioeconomic environ
ment of the United States. In many situations, economic reason
ing, which clearly dictates a particular course of action, is under
mined by the force of tax implications that have the effect of
misdirecting or preventing such action. Our purpose in this state
ment is to identify alternatives to the present law that we believe
would more closely align the tax treatment of these transactions
with their economic substance and that would thereby restore
a greater degree of neutrality to the decision processes of indi
viduals (and their agents) whose economic circumstances warrant
consideration of such transactions. The formal presentation of
this statement will assist members of congressional tax-writing
committees, members of the executive branch of the government,
and the public in their consideration of the issues involved.
Statements of tax policy are approved by the executive com
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the
division’s tax policy subcommittee. Other division subeommittees

may develop a policy statement if requested to do so. This state
ment was approved by the 1977-78 policy subcommittee and
executive committee.
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Introduction
Since the latter decades of the nineteenth century, corporate
formations and corporate mergers have played a major role in
the growth and development of the United States economy.1 The
aggregate, long-run effects of pooling human talents and eco
nomic resources through the establishment or combination of
corporate enterprises have generally been realized in the form
of accelerated rates of technological development, higher levels
of productive efficiency, and increased output of goods and
services. This nation’s relative strength and general prosperity,
which has resulted in large part from these activities, is testimony
to the general economic, social, and political desirability of the
establishment and growth of corporate enterprises.
As a matter of public policy, the importance of the continued
formation of new corporate businesses has been and continues to
be widely recognized.2 Few subjects, however, have given rise to
more heated controversy than has that of corporate mergers and
1. As used in this chapter of our analysis, a corporate acquisition or merger
is any acquisition of one corporation’s stock or assets by another corporation
resulting in the acquiring corporation’s operational control over the acquired
corporation. These corporate business combinations may take any one of
several forms (e.g., statutory merger, statutory consolidation, stock-for-stock
acquisition, etc.), each of which is discussed in the Appendix, “Current
Taxation of Formations and Combinations of Corporate Businesses.”
2. The establishment of new businesses has long been vigorously encouraged
through various forms of credit guarantees, low-interest loans, advisory
services, etc., made available through special legislation, the Department of
Commerce, and the Small Business Administration.

their economic impact.3 The debate focuses upon two primary
issues: the eff ect of business combinations on the competitive
structure and the degree of industrial concentration in the Amer
ican economy,4 and, to the extent that acquisitions and mergers
3. For the purpose of economic analysis, a merger is commonly classified
as either a horizontal merger, a vertical merger, or a conglomerate merger.
A horizontal merger is a combination of firms whose products are viewed
by buyers as highly substitutable—i.e., the products have a high cross
elasticity of demand.
The key distinction of the vertical merger is the successive functional
relationship that exists between the acquiring and the acquired firms—the
product of one firm is a production input for, or is marketed by, the other
firm. Generally, the merging of a supplier and a customer is a vertical
merger.
A conglomerate merger is any merger that is neither horizontal nor
vertical. The respective products of the acquiring and the acquired firms are
neither competitive nor vertically related. Thus, a completely conglomerate
merger produces a firm having a number of external markets equal to the
sum of the premerger external markets of the acquiring and the acquired
firms. The resultant conglomerate firm is a market-diversified firm in that it
operates in two or more separate product and/or geographical markets.
4. The term industrial concentration refers to the share of a particular type
of economic activity accounted for by a small group of firms performing a
large share of that activity. Measures of concentration have been based on
such indicators of economic activity as sales, total assets, profits, employ
ment, and value added by manufacture. Concentration may be examined
with reference to the economy as a whole, for particular industries, geo
graphical areas, or markets, and for individual products or services.
It is generally recognized that the high degree of concentration existing
in many industries today stems largely from two waves of merger activity
that were typified by the Standard Oil Trust in 1879 and later, at the turn
of the century, the emergence of such corporate giants as the United States
Steel Corporation, the American Tobacco Company, the General Electric
Company, and the American Can Corporation. The merger movement of
1924-1929 further increased the then prevailing levels of industrial concen
tration. See Fred J. Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large
Firms (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1 9 53), pp. 31 -4 6 ;
George J. Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger,” American Eco
nomic Review 40, no. 2 (May 1 9 5 0 ): 2 3 -2 4 ; John Moody, The Truth about
the Trusts: A Description and Analysis of the American Trust Movement
(New York: Moody Publishing Company, 1 9 0 4 ); and Samuel Richardson
Reid, Mergers, Managers and the Economy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1968), pp. 37-72. The motivation and role of mergers as a means
of increasing concentration in affected industries in recent years (postWorld War II to the present) is less certain. For discussions on these issues,
see Weston, The Role of Mergers, pp. 4 6 -4 9 ; J. Keith Butters, John Lintner,
and William L. Cary, Effects of Taxation: Corporate Mergers (Cambridge,
Mass.; The Riverside Press, 1951), pp. 241-2 8 0 and 2 8 7 -314; George D.
McCarthy, Acquisitions and Mergers (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
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explain the size of larger businesses, the nature and the effect of
the resultant business power exercised by these firms over markets
and consumers.5 The positions taken by responsible commentators
on each of these issues vary widely from one extreme to the other.
Although there is no unambiguous evidence about the propriety
of these respective positions, it does appear that the direct and
indirect socioeconomic effects of some business combinations have
been less than favorable and that the potential for future abuse
continues to exist.
It is not our purpose here to suggest the direction that public
policy should or might take in establishing criteria for evaluating
pany, 1963), pp. 9 -15; John C. Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market
Competition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 117-137;
Reid, Mergers, Managers and the Economy, pp. 7 3 -1 2 0 ; “Industrial Struc
ture and Competition Policy,” Study Paper no. 2, Studies by the Staff of the
Cabinet Committee on Price Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969), part II; Peter O. Steiner, Mergers: Motives, Effects,
Policies (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
5. Three different views may be found regarding the nature of business
power and its effect on markets and consumers. One view holds that the
U.S. economy is vigorously competitive, efficient, and progressive, with a
long-term record of relative price stability except for periods of war or
unsound governmental fiscal and monetary policies. See, for example, John S.
McGee, In Defense of Industrial Concentration (New York: Praeger Pub
lishers, 1971); Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and
the Economy (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Human Studies, Inc., 1970);
and Donald Dewey, The Theory of Imperfect Competition: A Radical Re
construction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
A second position holds that industrial control over markets is well
established and that such control has resulted in higher prices, poor product
quality, excessive wastes, and misallocation of resources within the economy.
See John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1967); Richard Caues, American Industry: Structure,
Conduct, Performance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 64);
“Industrial Structure and Competition Policy,” Study Paper no. 2, Studies
by the Staff of the Cabinet on Price Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1969); Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen,
American, Inc. (New York: Dial Press, 1 971); and John M. Blair, Economic
Concentration (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1972).
A third position holds that the available evidence on many important
points is incomplete or ambiguous and that additional research is essential
to sound policy decisions. See U.S., Congress, Senate, “The Role of Giant
Corporations in American and World Economies,” Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business of
the United States Senate, 91st Cong., July 9-11, 1969, pp. 5 0 2-513; and
Eugene M. Singer, Antitrust Economies: Selected Legal Cases and Economic
Models (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
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the desirability of specific business combinations. We do believe
that where public policy dictates that the interests of society are
best served by preventing, limiting, or retroactively remedying a
particular corporate acquisition or merger, the laws, regulations,
and sanctions em ployed to accom plish these objectives should
arise solely from sources outside the income tax law.6 If these laws,
regulations, and sanctions are properly constructed and adequately
enforced, there is simply no reason for the tax law to be burdened
with concepts that properly lie far beyond the limits of its respon
sibility.7 Indeed, any combinations that remain to be dealt with
for tax purposes ( other than those whose dominant motivation is
6. Anti-trust legislation and its enforcement by the anti-trust division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have been and
continue to be the primary source for the control of merger and acquisition
activity. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, however, enacted provisions (IRC
secs. 249, 279, 4 5 3 (b )(3 ), and 1232) directed toward the elimination of
“special and unwarranted inducements to mergers.” The House committee
reports that discuss these provisions indicate congressional interest in using
the tax law not only as a means of controlling tax avoidance in this area,
but also as a supplement to the existing arsenal of public policy tools aimed
at preventing certain types of business combinations that might adversely
“affect the competitive climate in the United States.” See H. Rept. 413,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1969-3 C.B. 263.
It has been argued by some, as it is argued here, that the question of
curbing mergers and acquisitions is essentially an antitrust question. Chair
man Russell Long of the Senate Finance Committee, for example, “has
stated that he favors alleviating the problem by amending anti-trust laws
rather than the income tax laws” Lybrand Newsletter (Lybrand, Ross, and
Montgomery), April 1969, p. 5. In testimony before the House Ways and
Means Committee, former Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren
took a somewhat cautious position: “To the extent that this committee finds
that the tax laws are in fact generating undesirable mergers, I hope that
remedial legislation can be worked out, without prejudice to beneficial
mergers or to legitimate borrowing” Legislative Analysis: The Conglomerate
Merger Tax Proposal (H.R. 7489) (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), p. 14. See also Paul Joseph Sax,
“The Conglomerate and Tax Reform: A Brief Review,” Tax Law Review
(Winter 1970), p. 235.
7. It has become increasingly common for the tax laws to be so burdened;
but, is this trend in the thinking of policy-makers necessarily a desirable
one? For an excellent discussion of this and related issues, see “Issues in
Simplification of the Income Tax Laws,” Studies by the Staff of the Joint
Economic Committee on Taxation (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977); and James S. Eustice, “Tax Complexity and the
Tax Practitioner,” California CPA Quarterly 44, no. 2 (September 1976):
10-17. Professor Eustice states that “The lax law is increasingly thought to
be a solution for practically every social or economic problem that the mind
of man can imagine. Surely there must be some limits to what this structure
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tax avoidance) would be desirable in a public policy sense and
should therefore be facilitated, or at least not hampered, through
the operation of “neutral” taxing provisions. One of our purposes
in this statement is to identify and recommend changes in those
provisions of the current law that lack neutrality and that thereby
unnecessarily hinder business combinations or force such com
binations to take inefficient forms.8
“Neutrality,” as the term is used here, refers to impartiality of
treatment. Impartiality is lacking where essentially similar tax
payers are treated differently under the tax law or where the same
tax treatment is accorded essentially different taxpayers or trans
actions. Partiality, where it exists, may be deliberate or it may
arise as a result of congressional, administrative, or judicial over
sight. To the extent taxing provisions depart from neutrality, for
whatever reason, they become regulatory in that they then deter
mine the directions in which taxpayers may become wealthy or
not. The resultant tax-induced distortion of economic decisions
can be justified only when supported by adequate public purpose
and ample prospect for achieving that purpose.
can carry. It seems that peripheral uses of the tax system have gone too far
afield from ( its) basic goals . . . , and this has done much to further the . . .
problems now plaguing the system” (p. 12).
8. In some situations, economic reasoning may clearly urge a particular
combination form (i.e., statutory merger, stock-for-stock acquisition, stockfor-asset acquisition, use of subsidiary in a statutory consolidation, e tc.);
but, the tax implications may force the parties to choose another, less effi
cient, form in order to obtain the benefit of nontaxability. For example, the
business the acquiring corporation wishes to purchase may have significant
contingent or inchoate liabilities whose potential impact is completely un
known at the time of the purchase. In such a case, the purchaser in a stockfor-stock acquisition runs the risk that it may be overpaying for the acquired
corporation’s stock. Alternatively, in a statutory merger or consolidation, the
acquiring corporation itself usually becomes liable automatically for all of
the acquired corporation’s known, unknown, or contingent liabilities. Thus,
where the contingent liabilities of the acquired corporation are great (or
the probability of unknown liabilities is high), the purchaser in a tax-free
world might prefer a stock-for-asset exchange and thereby acquire only
those assets it desires and assume only those debts it is willing to assume.
However, the disparate tax treatment of these alternative methods of acqui
sition could, under some circumstances, force the purchaser to use one of
the less efficient forms in order to achieve the overriding objective of non
taxability. For an excellent discussion of other common nontax factors
affecting the choice of acquisition method, see Zolman Cavitch, Tax Plan
ning for Corporations and Shareholders (New York: Matthew Bender,
1977).
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We believe that the current tax law, as it relates to the taxation
of corporate business enterprises, contains a great many depar
tures from neutrality that cannot be justified on the grounds of
“adequate public purpose.”9 In a statement submitted to the
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1976, the AICPA ex
pressed its concern about the lack of neutrality that persists in the
double taxation of corporate-source income and, among other
things, about the detrimental effect this lack continues to have
on capital accumulation.10 We recommend tax law modifications
that would allow either a deduction to the corporation for the
dividends it pays to its shareholders, or a tax credit to share
holders for those taxes paid by the corporation that are attribut
able to income distributed as d iv id e n d s.11Either method would
effectively eliminate the double tax imposed on dividend income
and thus mitigate many of the economic ills arising under the
current tax system.12
In this statement, we extend our interest in greater tax neu
trality to transactions involving the transfer of property to new or
existing corporations and to transactions in which two or more
corporations (or partnerships) are merged into a single economic
e n te rp rise .13We believe that tax considerations should influence
9. Indeed, the businessman or investor who, today, makes his decisions
solely on the basis of business facts without regard to tax implications is
almost surely destined for trouble.
10. AICPA, Elimination of the Double Tax on Dividends, Statement of
Tax Policy 3 (New York: AICPA, 1976).
11. This latter method is referred to as the “gross-up” method, since it
would also require the shareholder to include in his income the gross amount
of earnings out of which the dividend was paid. For illustrations of the
computations involved under both of these approaches, see Statement of Tax
Policy 3, Appendix 3, pp. 36-38.
12. For purposes of the recommendations we make in this statement, we
have generally assumed that corporations (except those subject to special
provisions, such as regulated investment companies and real estate invest
ment trusts under subchapter M, and certain small business corporations
under subchapter S) will continue to pay tax on their income and gains
under the present system of double taxation. Most of our recommendations,
however, would be the same under a tax system adopting either of the
proposed integration methods.
13. Our recommendations pertain only to tax reform in the area of “acquisi
tion type” reorganizations and do not include a consideration of changes
which may be desirable in the tax treatment of “divisive-type” reorganiza
tions (an arrangement by which shareholders of a single corporation split
up their respective investments among several corporate shells). Nor do we
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these types of transactions as little as possible. Many of the cur
rent provisions of subchapter C reduce the influence of tax con
siderations by providing for the deferral of the gain or loss realized
in certain distributions or e x c h a n g e s .14Our recommendations
would further reduce this influence by deferring, to the maximum
extent consistent with the prevention of tax avoidance, the recog
nition of taxable income, gain or loss upon a change of the form in
which a business is conducted or upon the combination of busi
nesses. Tax deferral would be extended to several types of trans
actions for which deferral is not currently permitted.
We believe that the tax consequences of a combination of
businesses or of a change in the form of organization through
which a business is conducted should not be made to depend
upon the size, or upon the relative sizes, of the businesses in
volved.
Many of the current tax rules relating to these activities were
adopted by Congress, the courts, or the Treasury Department to
mitigate hardships or to close actual or imagined “loopholes.” We
believe many of these rules are no longer needed and merely
operate as hindrances to the free structuring of profit-motivated
a c tiv itie s .15Greater neutrality would be best achieved by elim
inating or changing these rules, and some of our recommendations
are directed toward that end.
Anyone proposing change must be alert to undesirable or un
intended tax avoidance opportunities that currently exist or that
might be created by recommended changes. The tax avoidance
opportunities that concern us are mainly those that lead to (1) the
realization of capital gain by a shareholder where dividend treat
ment would be more appropriate, (2) tax deferral upon the re
moval of property from corporate to noncorporate ownership, and
(3) the deferral of income or gain under circumstances that allow
examine the defects in the present income and estate tax systems, which
so strongly influence the disposal of many of the small businesses that are
parties to reorganizations. See Butters, op. cit., and John Spenser Martin,
Possible Tax Impact on Decisions to Merge or Sell-out Closely-Held Cor
porations, unpublished dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970.
14. For example, sec. 351, Transfers to Controlled Corporations; sec. 354,
Exchanges of Stock and Securities in Certain Reorganizations; and sec.
355, Distribution of Stock and Securities of a Controlled Corporation.
15. For example, the “solely for voting stock” requirement of sec. 368
(a)(1)(B) and ( C).
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the taxpayer to avoid its taxable recognition permanently.16 Under
our recommendations, there will be more situations in which the
basis of assets will carry over from the transferor to the transferee.
We believe that the various anti-tax-avoidance provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code and the substance-over-form doctrine de
veloped under case law are adequate to prevent tax avoidance
through nontaxable transfers of high-basis-low-value assets to a
transferee desiring to use the built-in loss.

16. In some cases, tax avoidance opportunities arise from provisions other
than those directly governing reorganizations or other stockholder-corpora
tion transactions. To the extent these opportunities are deemed undesirable,
they should be eliminated by amending the provisions that create them, not
by unduly restricting the flow of assets into corporate ownership or between
corporations.
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Summary of Recommendations
The AICPA proposes several major changes in the laws cur
rently governing the taxation of transactions incident to the for
mation and combination of corporate business enterprises. *
Briefly, our recommendations provide for the following:
1. Expanding the scope of the provisions that permit deferral of
the gain (or loss) realized in certain types of transactions to
include many transactions that would not qualify for such
deferral under the present law.
2. Expanding the term “boot” to encompass any property re
ceived by the transferor (including the debt instruments, or
“securities,” of the transferee corporation) that is not an
“equity” interest in the transferee or, in certain cases, an
“equity” interest in its parent or subsidiary.
3. Adopting, for the purpose of determining the extent to which
a transaction would qualify for tax deferral, attribution rules
that recognize the economic ties of corporations related to
each other through stock ownership.
4. Enlarging both (a) the list of the tax attributes of a trans
ferred “business” that would carry over to the transferee of the
“business” and ( b ) the list of transactions that would result in
such carryovers.
5. Establishing new rules to determine the extent to which “boot”
received by a transferor in a partly taxable transaction should
be treated as an ordinary dividend.

* These existing rules and their historical development are briefly reviewed
in the Appendix.
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6. Modifying the current rules for determining the presence and
amount of taxable “boot” when a transferee-corporation as
sumes a transferor’s liability.
7. Reducing the number of events that would give rise to the
recapture of certain tax credits (e.g., the investment tax
credit) and, where recapture is appropriate, placing the bur
den of such recapture on the transferee rather than on the
transferor as under current law.
In regard to the taxation of combinations of noncorporate
business enterprises, we propose changes that would—
1. Prevent the “termination” of any partnership that is a party
to a combination of partnerships.
2. Provide for the carryover of the tax characteristics of a trans
ferred business to the continuing partnership.

10

ANALYSIS OF
RECOMMENDATIONS

Formation and Combination of
Corporate Business Enterprises
This chapter describes and explains our recommendations for
changes in the tax treatment of the formation, enlargement, or
combination of corporate business enterprises.1 References to
“code,” “subchapter,” and “section” are references to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and its components. References to “regula
tions” are references to the Treasury regulations. The first part
of this policy statement identifies three basic categories of trans
actions and the circumstances under which, in our opinion, each
should qualify for tax deferral. This part also examines the general
tax eonsequences to the parties involved in transactions that
would be wholly or partially tax free under our recommendations.
In the second part we define and explain in detail some of the
terms used in the first part and some of the new rules recom
mended there for applying its basic provisions.

Transfer of a ''Business" to a Corporation
Conditions for Tax Deferral
Where all the essential components of an incorporated or un
incorporated “business”2 are transferred to a corporation by one

1. The recommendations in this chapter deal with transactions presently
described in sec. 351, Transfers to Controlled Corporations, and sec. 3 6 8 (a )
(1)(A) through (D ), Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganizations.
2. The term business would, for this purpose, have the same meaning that
it currently has under sections 346 and 355, except that no particular mini
mum period of time during which the business was actively conducted
before its transfer would be required.
According to reg. sec. 1.355-1( c ) , a business consists of “A specific
existing group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning

13

or more corporate or noncorporate transferor (s),3 the transaction
should be nontaxable if both of the following conditions hold:
a. Our proposed “continuity of interest” test (below) is satisfied
by the transferor or group of transferors.
b. Only the “equity” of the transferee corporation or of its
“parent” is received in the exchange by the transferors.
We believe that transactions meeting these two requirements
should be nontaxable regardless of the nature and extent of the
transferors’ “control” over the transferee after the transaction.
Thus, we would abolish the 80 percent minimum control require
ment currently applied to many transactions involving the trans
fer of a business.4

income or profit from only such group of activities, and the activities included
in such group must include every operation which forms a part of, or a step
in, the process of earning income or profit from such group. Such group of
activities ordinarily must include the collection of income and the payment
of expenses. It does not include—(1 ) the holding for investment purposes
of stock, securities, land, or other property, including casual sales thereof
(whether or not the proceeds of such sales are reinvested), (2 ) the owner
ship and operation of land or buildings all or substantially all of which are
used and occupied by the owner in the operation of a trade or business, or
(3 ) a group of activities which, while a part of a business operated for
profit, are not themselves independently producing income even though
such activities would produce income with the addition of other activities
or with large increases in activities previously incidental or insubstantial.”
For examples of activities that would qualify as businesses, see reg. sec.
1.355-1(d ).
A transfer of all the essential components of a business would satisfy
our test. This minimum requirement would not prevent the tax-free transfer
of components that are part of the business though not essential to it.
3. The transferors need not each be the owner or co-owner of a complete
“business.” It is enough that the transferors in the aggregate, pursuant to
a single plan, transfer assets which together amount to a “business”—even
though some or all of the transferors may transfer assets that, taken alone,
would not qualify. For example, the owner-lessor of a factory building
could join with the lessee in a tax-free transfer of the building and the
manufacturing business carried on therein. If a group of transferors, pur
suant to a single plan, combine assets that neither severally nor jointly have
ever functioned as a business, but together comprise all of the elements
needed to function as a business, the transfer of such assets to a corpora
tion would also qualify as the transfer of a business.
4. Under present law, the transferors of a business in an exchange described
in sec. 351 must be in “control” of the transferee immediately after the
exchange. Control is defined in sec. 3 6 8 (c ) as the ownership of stock
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We also favor eliminating the “solely for voting stock” require
ment presently applicable to some reorganizations.5 The trans
ferors should be permitted to receive any type of the transferee’s
or its parent’s equity, voting or nonvoting, without disqualifying
the transaction for tax deferral.
Current law permits an acquiring corporation in a reorganiza
tion to give either its own stock or that of the corporation that
controls it within the meaning of section 368(c ) ( the 80 percent80 percent test described in note 4 ).6 Current law also permits an
acquiring corporation to transfer part or all of the acquired assets
or stock to a corporation it controls.7
We recommend relaxing the requirements for use of parent
stock or transfers to a subsidiary by an acquiring corporation in
two ways:
1. We would reduce the required ownership to more than 50
percent of the net voting pow er (from the current 80 percent80 percent control).
2. In measuring net voting power, we would use the attribution
rules described in the special rules and definitions, below,
and permit the use of equity in a “parent” more than one tier
above the acquiring corporation and the transfer of acquired
stock or property to a “subsidiary” more than one tier below

possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
5. The “solely for voting stock” requirement applicable to type B and, to
a lesser extent, type C reorganizations has been the subject of a great deal
of criticism by commentators in this area. See, for example, Richard R.
Dailey, “The Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations,” Tax
Law Review, 26 (May 1971): 725-779; Thomas J. Henry, “Solely for
Voting Stock Test Clouds Practical Mergers by ‘C’ Reorganizations,” Journal
of Taxation 14 (May 1961): 266-269; and Frank S. Deming, “How ‘Solely’
Is Solely for Voting Stock: Current Problems in ‘B’ and ‘C’ Reorganizations,”
N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 29 (1 9 7 1 ): 397-418.
In addition to preventing tax deferral in many deserving transactions,
this requirement also permits taxpayers to avoid nontaxability (e.g., so that
a loss will be recognized) almost at will by embellishing an otherwise
qualified exchange with a relatively small amount of boot, or with nonvoting
shares.
6. Sec. 368(a)(1)(B ) and (C ) and (2)(D ) and ( E ).
7. Sec. 368(a)(2)(C ).
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the acquiring corporation, provided the parent or subsidiary
meets the net-voting-power test.
The privileges of using parent equity and of transferring
property or stock to a subsidiary would be available to the acquir
ing corporation in any of the transactions described in this part.
After an exchange of a business for equity, the transferor(s)
may retain the equity received in the transaction. However, if the
transferor is a corporation, it may distribute the equity so received
to its own shareholders. If the transferor exchanged substantially
all its properties, the transaction resembles the type C reorganiza
tion of present law [sec. 368(a)(1)(C)] except for the more
relaxed requirements we recommend above. Under our recom
mendations, as under present law, the exchange by the share
holders of their equity in the transferor corporation for the equity
received from the acquiring corporation would be nontaxable
( except to the extent of boot received by them) only if the trans
feror corporation exchanges substantially all its assets. If the trans
feror corporation were permitted to distribute the equity received
to its own shareholders and retain a business, our recommenda
tions would lead to a liberalization of the rules of section 355,
which deals with divisive reorganizations. Divisive reorganiza
tions are outside the scope of this statement, and we take no posi
tion on whether their treatment should be changed. Current law
allows a corporation to enter into a type C reorganization even
if it does not own a “business,” and we would continue this treat
ment if substantially all of the transferor corporation’s assets are
exchanged.8
The “Continuity of In terest Test
Under the current judicially developed rules, even those re
organizations satisfying the strict statutory requirements will not
qualify for tax deferral unless the character of the transferor’s in
terest in the transferee corporation indicates a substantial con
tinuation of the transferor’s prior economic interest. There is at
present no clear-cut rule for what will or will not satisfy this
“continuity of interest” requirement. We recommend that the con-

8. Provided it is not an “investment company” subject to sec. 3 6 8 (a )
(2 )(F ).
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tinuity-of-interest test be statutorily defined to require that at
least 20 percent of the total aggregate value of all equity and boot
received by the transferors be retained by them “immediately
after” the transaction in the form of equity.9 If the transferor is a
corporation, we would measure the retained holdings by including
those retransferred to, and retained by, a “subsidiary” within the
meaning of our proposed attribution rules, below. The term
immediately after would have the same meaning that it presently
has in transactions requiring the transferors to be in control of the
transferee “immediately after” the exchange.1
0 If a transferor
corporation redistributes the equity to its shareholders, the
continuity-of-interest test must be met by them.11
Only “Equity” Can B e R eceived Tax Free
“Securities” treated as “boot.” Under our recommendations,
any property that is received by the transferor( s) in an otherwise
nontaxable exchange and that is not “equity” in the transferee or
its parent would be treated as “boot.” All corporate indebtedness,
regardless of whether it is represented by a ninety-day nonnegotiable note or by a twenty-year bond listed on an exchange, would
therefore be considered boot because it is not a proprietary, or
9. To illustrate the application of this test, assume the following facts: Ten
partners (each owning an equal interest in the partnership) transfer their
entire manufacturing business to X Corporation and, thereby, dissolve the
partnership. In exchange for the business, X Corporation pays each of eight
of the partners $10,000 in cash. The remaining two partners receive X
Corporation equity having a combined value of $20,000.
Since the subject of the transfer was a “business,” the tax consequences
arising from the exchange would not be dependent upon the degree of
“control” in the hands of the transferors immediately after the exchange.
However, the “continuity of interest” test would apply. Since two of the
transferors retain a combined 20 percent of the total consideration received
by the transferor group in the form of X Corporation equity, the exchange
satisfies the “continuity of interest” test. To the two partners receiving only
X Corporation equity, the exchange is nontaxable. The remaining transferors
received none of the transferee’s equity and, therefore, would recognize the
full amount of the gain or loss they realized on the exchange.
10. Momentary retention of the transferee’s equity, therefore, would not be
sufficient if (1 ) the transferors agreed before the exchange to transfer
enough of their equity so as to fail the “continuity of interest” test or (2 )
such a transfer was an integral part of the plan under which the exchange
was consummated.
11. Cf. sec. 3 5 1 (c ).
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equity, interest in the transferee corporation.12 This treatment
would be a departure from current law governing transactions
described in section 351, under which the transferee corporation’s
“securities” (that is, evidences of indebtedness which rise to the
dignity of “securities”) may be received tax-free by the transferor(s) of property who control the corporation immediately
after the exchange. A transferor would no longer be able to re
ceive tax-free any debt instruments of the transferee in exchange
for assets.13
The treatment of securities as boot is not intended to change
the current tax treatment of a person who was a creditor of the
transferred business before the transaction. Under our recom
mendations, a creditor of the transferred business would be per
mitted to become a creditor of the successor enterprise without
adverse tax effect. No gain or loss would be recognized by the
creditor to the extent that any notes or securities received by him
represented merely the conversion of his pre-existing creditor
interest in the old business into a creditor interest in the new
corporate debtor.14
12. Although throughout the statutory history of sec. 351, transferors have
been permitted to receive “securities” tax-free in the exchange, our position
is not without support in the case law dealing with such transactions (and
analogous reorganization provisions). For example, in LeTulle v. Scofield,
309 U.S. 694 (1 9 4 0 ), 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶(9150, a corporation transferred
all its assets to another corporation for cash and bonds of the transferee
corporation. The Supreme Court held that even though “securities” were
received by the transferors, the transaction was not tax-free: “Where the
consideration is wholly in the transferee’s bonds, or part cash and part such
bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transferor retains any proprietary
interest in the enterprise. On the contrary he becomes a creditor of the
transferee; and we do not think that the fact . . . that the bonds were
secured solely by the assets transferred and that, upon default, the bond
holder would retake only the property sold, changes his status from that of
a creditor to one having a proprietary stake, within the purview of the
statute.” See also Roebling v. Comm., 143 F.2d 810, 4 4 -2 U.S. Tax Cas.
¶9388 (3d Cir. 1944). These cases, in effect, hold that the receipt of only
securities by the transferor does not give him a continuity of interest in the
enterprise.
13. Since the establishment of many “thin” corporations is based upon the
tax-free receipt of “securities” in a sec. 351 exchange, this proposal can be
expected to reduce the number and magnitude of tax problems arising in
this troublesome area of corporate income taxation.
14. Under present law, gain would be recognized by the creditor only if
the face or principal amount of the securities received exceeded the face
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This treatment would apply even if the creditor also owns or
receives equity in the transferee. However, since a sole proprietor
cannot own a debt of his own enterprise, he could not receive a
debt of its transferee tax free upon the incorporation of his busi
ness. If a partnership is indebted to one or more of its partners, we
believe that it should be treated as a group of sole proprietors to
determine the tax consequences of the assumption of such debt by
the transferee corporation. If the debt is owed to all the partners
in the ratio of their interests, each partner’s share of the debt
is in substance owed to himself, and the entire assumption of the
debt by the transferee would be treated as boot. If the debt
assumed by the corporation is owed disproportionately to the
partners, the amount of boot received by each partner would be
that portion of the assumed debt that could have been eliminated
by a proportionate forgiveness of debts by all partners. For ex
ample, assume that A and B hold 25 percent and 75 percent in
terests in Partnership AB, and that AB owes $90,000 to A and
$60,000 to B. Of the total debt, $80,000 could be eliminated by
proportionate (25/75) forgiveness ($20,000 by A and $60,000
by B ), which would leave AB owing $70,000 to A. If, upon the
incorporation of the partnership, the transferee corporation as
sumed only the remaining $70,000 debt owed to A, neither A nor
B would be treated as having received boot.15 But if the transferee
assumed the full $150,000 debt, A would have boot of $20,000
($90,000 assumed less $70,000 disproportionate) and B would
have boot of $60,000 ($60,000 assumed less $0 disproportionate).16
Treatment of Liabilities Assumed by the Transferee. Under
general principles of taxation, if a taxpayer transfers property and,
incident to the transfer, the transferee assumes a liability of the
or principal amount of the debt instrument surrendered [secs. 354(a)(2)
and 3 5 6 (d )].
15. Unless the assumption triggers boot treatment under sec. 3 5 7 (b ) (pres
ence of a tax avoidance motive) or sec. 3 5 7 (c ) (liabilities assumed by the
transferee exceed transferor’s basis in the transferred assets).
16. Although it can be argued that 25 percent of A’s remaining $70,000
claim is in substance owed by A to himself, we believe that the incorpora
tion of partnerships would become prohibitively complex and expensive if
partners were treated as having received boot even after elimination of all
proportionate debts. Sec. 3 57(b ) may have to be expanded to prevent
abuses of these rules.
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transferor or takes property subject to a liability, the amount of
such liability is considered part of the consideration received by
the transferors.17If this rule were applied to incorporations or com
binations of going businesses, few such transactions would be tax
free. Since the transferee ordinarily takes the business subject to
its business debts, many transactions could not qualify as nontaxable and, in those that could qualify, the amount of boot would
be so great as to make them largely or fully taxable anyway.
Therefore, section 357(a) provides an exception to the general
rule. If a person transfers property to a corporation in an incor
poration or reorganization, and in the same transaction the cor
poration assumes a liability of the transferor or takes property sub
ject to a liability, this relief from the debt is not considered boot.
However, this favorable treatment does not apply if “taking into
consideration the nature of the liability and the circumstances in
the light of which the arrangement for the assumption or acquisi
tion was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the tax
payer with respect to the assumption or acquisition . . . was a
purpose to avoid federal income tax on the exchange, or . . . was
not a bona fide business purpose.”18 Nor does it apply ( in a sec
tion 351 exchange and in reorganizations described in section
3 6 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( D ) ) if the total liabilities transferred by the trans
feror exceed the aggregate adjusted basis of all the properties
transferred by him. The excess of liabilities over the aggregate ad
justed basis represents taxable gain under section 357( c ) . 19
We would retain the general rule of section 357(a) but would
modify the first exception as follows.
Currently, if the transferor’s principal purpose with respect to
any transferred liability is tax avoidance, all of the liabilities as
sumed by or transferred (with property) to the transferee cor
poration will be treated as boot. This is also true where any
transferred liability lacks a business purpose. The extremely harsh
17. Crane v. Comm., 331 U.S. 1 (1 9 4 7 ), 47-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 217.
18. Sec. 3 5 7 (b ). See Frank M. Burke and Sam W. Chisholm, “Section
357: A Hidden Trap in Tax Free Incorporations,” Tax Law Review 25 (Jan
uary 1970): 211.
19. If the transferor in the exchange is a corporation and the transfer en
compasses substantially all of its assets, the excess of liabilities over basis
would not be treated as boot, just as such excess is not treated as boot under
present law in “type A” and “type C” reorganizations [sec. 357 (c) ].
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results that can arise under this all-or-nothing rule seem punitive;
we recommend that it be amended.20 The existence of one im
proper purpose” liability should not taint all other liabilities. Thus,
we believe that only those liabilities transferred for the principal
purpose of tax avoidance should be treated as boot. We also be
lieve that where there is no tax avoidance motive, a transferor
should not be penalized simply because a business purpose cannot
be proved.

Effects of Transaction: Transferor
Receipt o f Boot
Under our recommendations, if a business is transferred to a
corporation solely in exchange for the transferee’s or its parent’s
equity, no gain or loss would be recognized by the transferor(s)
regardless of the nature and extent of their interest in the trans
feree immediately after the transaction. Nor would the transferor(s) be required to recapture any of the tax benefits asso
ciated with the transferred property.21
When a transferor receives boot in addition to equity in a
transaction that otherwise qualifies for tax deferral, gain, but not
loss, would be recognized to the extent of the value of the boot
received. Since the subject matter of the transfer is property com
prising a business and not the equity of a corporation, any gain
recognized by the transferor would not be treated as a dividend,
but rather as gain arising from a sale or exchange of property. The
character of the gain would therefore be determined by reference
to the character and holding period of the transferred assets.
If the transferor is a corporation that distributes part or all of
the boot received pursuant to the plan of reorganization, gain
would be recognized (as under current law) only to the extent
of the value of the boot which is not distributed.22
20. For example, if a transferor has the transferee corporation assume a
$30,000 mortgage on transferred property (business purpose present), but
in the same transaction causes the corporation to assume a $1,000 personal
debt (business purpose lacking), the entire $31,000 would be treated as
boot under sec. 3 5 7 (b ).
21. For example, depreciation recapture under secs. 1245 and 1250.
22. Sec. 3 6 1 (b ).
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Basis and Holding Period o f Equity and Boot
A transferor’s basis and holding period in the equity and boot
received in the exchange would be determined in the same man
ner in which a transferor’s basis and holding period in “stock or
securities” and boot are determined under present law.2323
Recapture of Certain Credits
Under current law, if a taxpayer disposes of “section 38 prop
erty,” or if the property ceases to qualify as section 38 property
before the end of the required holding period, part or all of the
investment tax credit may have to be recaptured. However, where
the premature “disposition” is nothing more than the “mere
change in the form of conducting the taxpayer’s trade or busi
ness,” the transferor is not required to recapture the credit as long
as the property is retained in such trade or business as section 38
property and the transferor himself retains a “substantial interest”
in such trade or business.24 We propose a further liberalization of
this rule. Since existing rules require recapture if either the trans
feree business disposes of the section 38 property or the transferor
disposes of a substantial part of his interest in the business, the
credit must often be recaptured even where the property con
tinues to be used in the business. Similar problems may arise
in a number of other situations outside the scope of this statement,
including that of a corporation that elects subchapter S status while
owning investment credit property.
In order to make it easier to transfer businesses and interests
in businesses, we recommend that the investment credit be re
captured only if the property ceases to qualify as section 38 prop
erty in the hands of the owner or the transferee owner, or is dis
posed of in a transaction which requires recapture before the

23. Secs. 358 and 1 2 2 3 (1 ).
24. According to the regulations, a transferor will be considered as having
retained a “substantial interest” in the business only if, after the change in
form, his interest is substantial in relation to the total interest of all persons
or is at least equal to his interest prior to the change in form [reg. sec.
1 .4 7 -3 (f) (2 ) and ( 6 ), examples 1, 3, and 4]. Section 4 7 (b ) also exempts
from recapture transfers by death and transactions to which section 3 8 1 (a )
applies.
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credit is fully earned. The mere disposition of an interest in the
organization that owns the property should not give rise to re
capture. Whenever the property is prematurely disposed of or
ceases to qualify as section 38 property, the resulting recapture
should fall on the taxpayer who disposes of it or its then sub
chapter S shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries.25 Thus, it may
be that one person will receive the benefit of the credit and that
another must repay it. This change would result in the same treat
ment for investment credit recapture as is presently provided for
depreciation recapture.
Similar rules should apply to the credit for work incentive
programs and other business incentive credits that may be
enacted.
We believe that the tax avoidance opportunities inherent in
this recommendation are insubstantial. Where the acquisition of
section 38 property and its subsequent disposition to a transferee
in a nontaxable transaction are part of a plan designed to enable
the transferor to claim the investment credit that should go to the
transferee, the well-established “step transaction” doctrine would
prevent this tax-avoidance-motivated shifting of the credit. This
doctrine would likewise prevent tax avoidance where, as a part
of a single plan, the transfer of the section 38 property is followed
by the disposition of the transferor’s interest in the transferee.

Effects of Transaction: Stockholders of the Transferor
If the transferor corporation has exchanged substantially all
its assets and redistributes the equity received in the exchange,
its shareholders will recognize no loss and will recognize gain
or dividend income or both only to the extent of the value of the
boot they receive. The rules for determining their gain, dividend
income, basis, and holding period are the same as for transferors
of equity in a direct exchange of equity for equity, and they are,
therefore, discussed below.

25. Under current law, the burden of the investment credit recapture falls
on the transferor who originally claimed the credit, regardless of whether
his action or that of the transferee causes the recapture [reg. sec. 1.47-3(f)
(5 ) and ( 6 ) , example ( 2 ) ] .
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Effects of Transaction: Transferee
Recognition of Gain or Loss
The receipt of money or other property by a corporation in
exchange for its own capital stock (including treasury stock)
produces neither gain nor loss for the recipient corporation.26
Thus, where a corporation acquires a business using only its own
or its parent’s equity as consideration, it recognizes no gain or loss.
If, however, the acquiring corporation gives up boot in the ex
change, it would recognize gain or loss to the extent that the value
of the boot diff ers from the acquiring corporation’s tax basis in
the boot property. The character of the gain would depend upon
the character and holding period of the boot property.
Under our recommendations, debt given by the acquiring
corporation would be considered boot, and the amount of such
boot would be measured by the fair market value of the debt. Any
difference between the value of the debt and its face amount
would be treated as a bond premium or discount.
Basis and Holding Period o f Acquired Property
The acquiring corporation’s basis and holding period in the
property it acquires in the exchange would be determined under
the same rules as are presently applicable to such acquisitions. 27
Carryover of Tax Attributes
Under section 381, a corporation that acquires substantially
all the properties of another corporation in a reorganization or in
certain liquidations also acquires many of the tax benefits, privi
leges, elective rights, and tax burdens of the predecessor corpora
tion. Our recommendations expand the list of transactions that
would lead to a carryover of tax attributes to include any acquisi
tion of a business by a corporation if our proposed continuity-ofinterest test is met.28 Carryover would be required regardless of

26. Sec. 1032. Under the reorganization rules, parent stock can also be
given (n. 6, supra).
27. Secs. 362 and 1 2 2 3 (2 ).
28. That is, if at least 20 percent of the aggregate value of all equity and
boot transferred in the exchange is retained by the transferors immediately
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whether or not the business was incorporated before the exchange
and whether or not it was the transferor’s only business.29
We believe that the carryover of the tax characteristics of the
predecessor corporation should not be subject to any rules more
rigorous than our proposed continuity-of-interest test (including
those now referred to in sections 382 and 383). All such character
istics were generated by the enterprise and, if our continuity-ofinterest test is met, should continue with the enterprise regardless
of changes in ownership.
Our recommendations would also enlarge the list of tax
attributes to be carried over to the successor corporation. We be
lieve that all special tax characteristics associated with the trans
ferred business (as distinguished from those associated with the
transferor itself or the transferor’s retained property) should be
carried over to the acquiring corporation. These carryover char
acteristics would include (but not be limited to) all recapture
potentials, the deductibility of unfunded pension costs and de
ferred compensation arrangements relating to those employees of
the transferor who will continue to be employed by the transferee,
all accounting methods ( including accelerated depreciation
methods used by the transferred business), as well as (to the
extent they are attributable to the transferred business) any net
operating loss carryovers, operations loss carryovers of life insur
ance companies, contributions carryovers, and foreign tax credit
carryovers. If the acquiring corporation is already in the same
business as the acquired business, any conflict of methods would
be resolved according to the principles of the present regulations
under section 381.30
The determination or allocation of items attributable to the
transferred business should be based upon an analysis of the
source of the item involved, rather than upon a mechanical pro
ration according to the relative fair market values of the assets
after the transaction in the form of the acquiring corporation’s equity (or
that of its parent).
29. Although the expanded carryover of tax characteristics recommended
below would apply regardless of whether the transferor is a corporation or
an unincorporated owner, some carryovers would probably need to remain
with the transferor unless the transferor is a corporation. This treatment
would apply with respect to carryovers the tax treatment of which differs
materially between corporate and noncorporate taxpayers.
30. Reg. sec. 1.3 8 1 (c) ( 4 ) - l .
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transferred and those retained by the transferor.31 Where the
transferor is a corporation that remains in existence after the ex
change, its earnings and profits would remain unchanged except
for the increase required for gain recognized in the exchange.

Transfers to a Corporation of Property Other
Than a Business
Transactions Qualifying for Tax Deferral
Section 351 is currently the only provision that allows an un
incorporated taxpayer to transfer property tax free to a new or
existing corporation. Under the current law, gain or loss realized
by the transferor(s) is deferred only if immediately after the ex
change the transferor or group of transferors own at least 80 per
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of the
transferee’s voting stock and at least 80 percent of the total num
ber of shares of all other classes. If this control requirement is
satisfied, the transaction, with respect to each individual trans
feror, is tax free to the extent that only the “stock or securities”
of the transferee are received in the exchange. When the transfer
includes all essential parts of a business, our recommendations
would change these rules as described above under “Transfer of
a Business to a Corporation.” Thus, section 351 would become
superfluous for transfers of a business and also for transfers of
substantially all the assets of a corporation.32
However, section 351 serves other useful purposes, and we
would retain it in amended form. It permits the tax-free transfer
of any property (including property that does not by itself
amount to a complete business), and thus makes it easier for a
corporation to acquire additional assets. A partner is permitted
tax-free transfer of assets to his partnership regardless of his per
centage interest in the partnership,33 and strict tax neutrality,
31. For example, assume the transferor has a foreign tax credit carryover
attributable partly to the transferred and partly to a retained business. The
allocation between the businesses would be based not on their relative
values but on the foreign taxes paid or incurred by each business and on
the extent to which the transferor has been able to use such taxes as credits
as a result of the operations of the businesses.
32. See “Effect of Transaction: Stockholders of the Transferor,” p. 23.
33. Sec. 721.
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therefore, would demand the elimination of the section 351 “con
trol” requirement, so that any transfer of property for equity
would become tax free. On the other hand, a transfer of a small
amount of property in exchange for a minute equity interest in a
large corporation is similar to a sale. We recommend that w here
the property transferred to the corporation is property other than
all the essential elements of a business, neither gain nor loss be
recognized if both of the following conditions exist:
1. The transferor(s) receives only the equity of the transferee or
its parent.
2. After the exchange, the transferors own more than 50 percent
(instead of at least 80 percent) of the value of the transferee
corporation’s or its parent’s total outstanding equity.
In making this test, our proposed attribution rules ( set forth in the
definitions section that follows) would apply. Unlike the current
“80 percent control” test, the new test would disregard the type of
the equity (voting or nonvoting) owned by the transferor(s). If
a transaction qualified under these rules, and also as a transfer of
a business to a corporation, the more liberal rules for transfers of a
business would apply.
Where the transferor(s) receives boot in addition to the trans
feree’s equity, gain, but not loss, would be recognized to the ex
tent of the value of the boot. Securities received by the trans
feror(s) would be treated in the same manner and under the
same rules as would securities received by transferor(s) of a busi
ness.34 Similarly, the rules proposed for the treatment of liabilities
assumed by the transferee corporation in an exchange of a busi
ness would also apply to the transactions described here.35
Effects of Transaction: Transferor
Receipt o f Boot. Boot received by the transferor(s) in an
otherwise nontaxable exchange would generally be treated under
our recommendations the same as under the present law. Any
gain, but not loss, realized by a transferor in the exchange would
be recognized to the extent of the fair market value of boot re
ceived. The character of the gain would generally depend upon
the character of the assets transferred by the transferor. However,
34. See “Securities Treated as Boot,” p. 17.
35. See “Treatment of Liabilities Assumed by the Transferee,” p. 19.
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we recommend that more specific rules be enacted to clarify the
tax treatment of boot received by a transferor in exchange for
corporate equity. When the property transferred to the corpora
tion includes equity in another corporation, the receipt of boot
could have the effect of a dividend, and its tax treatment should
be determined under the rules discussed below for similar ex
changes in a reorganization when boot is received by the trans
feror (s ).36
Basis and Holding Period o f Properties Received. A trans
feror’s basis and holding period in the equity and boot received in
the exchange would be determined in the same manner that a
transferor’s basis and holding period in stock or securities and
boot is determined under present law.37
Effects o f Transaction: Transferee
The tax consequences for a transferee corporation would be
the same as for a transferee of a business, except that there would
be a carryover of only those tax attributes inherent in the property
transferred (for example, depreciation recapture potential).

Reorganizations Involving Exchanges of Equity
for Equity
Conditions for Tax Deferral
We recommend liberalizing the reorganization provisions
(mainly section 3 6 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ) , which now permit tax-free ex
changes of stock in one corporation for stock in another. Our
recommendations for changes in these provisions are analogous to
some of those already presented. We would abolish the solely-forvoting-stock requirement of current law by permitting the acquir
ing corporation to give any type of its or its parent’s equity with
out disqualifying the transaction. Rather than require control
within the meaning of section 368(c) (the 80 percent control
test), we would require only that the acquiring corporation or its
subsidiary hold more than 50 percent of the total value of the
acquired corporation’s outstanding equity after the exchange. In
36. See “Effects of Transaction: Transferor,” p. 30.
37. Secs. 358 and 1 2 2 3 (1 ).
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making this test, our proposed attribution rules ( as set forth in the
section on definitions, below) would apply.
Under our recommendations, a direct exchange of corporate
equity for corporate equity can be nontaxable under one of two
different provisions, or under both of them:
1. If, after the transaction, the transferee corporation owns more
than 50 percent of the equity in the other corporation, the ex
change would be a nontaxable stock acquisition under our
recommendations here.
2. If, after the transaction, the transferor(s) owns more than 50
percent of the equity in the transferee corporation, the ex
change would be nontaxable under our recommendations for
transfers to a corporation of property other than a business.
Effects o f Transaction: Transferor(s)
Our recommendations for the tax treatment of the transferor(s) of stock apply not only to those transferors who par
ticipate in a direct equity-for-equity exchange described in the
immediately preceding paragraph, but also to those who, in ex
change for the transferee’s equity, transfer equity in a section
351 transaction or surrender part or all of their equity in a cor
poration that has transferred substantially all its assets to another
corporation.
Under present law, in a stock-for-stock exchange, the assump
tion of a liability of the transferor or taking the transferred equity
subject to a liability is treated as boot because section 357 does
not apply to exchanges under section 354. We would continue this
rule.
The transferor’s basis and holding period in the property re
ceived in the exchange ( that is, the acquiring corporation’s equity,
or both boot and equity) would be determined as under current
law.38
38. Secs. 358 and 1223 (1 ). The basis of boot received will be its fair market
value, and its holding period starts when it is received. The basis of equity
will be the transferor’s basis in the equity given up, minus the value of boot
received, minus debt transferred to the acquiring corporation (to the extent
such debt is not already included in boot), plus the amount of dividend
taxed and the amount of gain recognized by the transferor. The holding
period will usually carry over from the equity surrendered to the equity
received.

29

Receipt o f Boot
Where boot is received in an otherwise tax-free exchange by
persons who have given equity in the exchange, the question
arises, under current law and under our recommendations,
whether and to what extent the value of boot received by such
persons is to be taxed as a dividend.
1. Exchange proceeds or dividend income?
Under current law, if boot is received in an otherwise taxfree reorganization exchange, any gain realized by the re
cipient is taxable to the extent of the value of the boot re
ceived.39 Loss is not recognized.40 The recognized gain is
treated as a dividend if the exchange has the “eff ect” of a
dividend distribution.41 To the extent that it does not have this
“effect,” the gain is treated as realized from an exchange and is
usually a capital gain. Uncertainty arises, however, because
neither the code nor the regulations indicate how to determine
whether an exchange has this “effect.” It is likely that any boot
received in a combination of corporations will be treated as
a dividend unless the transferor has no equity interest in
the acquiring corporation after the exchange (although a
“meaningful-reduction-of-stock-ownership” test seems to be
developing).42
In order to reduce this uncertainty and to apply similar tax
rules to transactions with similar economic effect, we recom
mend that the treatment of boot received by the shareholders
39. Sec. 3 5 6 (a ).
40. Sec. 3 5 6 (c ).
41. Sec. 3 5 6 (a ) ( 2 ).
42. In Comm. v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1 9 4 5 ), 4 5 -1 U.S. Tax
Gas. ¶9311 (1 9 4 5 ), the Supreme Court indicated that the mere existence
of undistributed accumulated earnings and profits was enough to give the
distribution the effect of a dividend. However, several lower courts have
rejected any such mechanical approach in making this determination. In
stead, a meaningful reduction in the shareholder’s proportionate interest has
been sufficient to render the boot distribution not equivalent to a dividend.
See, for example, Shimberg v. U.S., 415 F. Supp. 832 (D. Fla. 1976), 76—2
U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9565; Wright v. U.S., 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), 7 3 -2
U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9583; and Idaho Tower Co. v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct.
Cl. 1958), 58-1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9511. See also Bruce D. Shoulson, “Boot
Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule,” Tax Law Review 20
(March 1965 ): 573. Note that in some situations a taxpayer may prefer a
dividend to a long-term capital gain.
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in any equity-for-equity exchange be determined under the
rules, slightly modified, of sections 302 through 306.43 For this
purpose, we would not compare the transferor’s percentage
ownership in the acquired corporation before the transaction
with his percentage ownership in the acquiring corporation
after the transaction.44 Instead, we would compare his pre
reorganization percentage interest in the acquired corporation
with the percentage he receives of the total equity given up
by the acquiring corporation. For example, assume that Stock
holder N owns 60 percent of the stock of Corporation A. As
sume further that Corporation B acquires all of the stock of
Corporation A in exchange for cash and its own stock. In the
transaction, N receives cash plus 45 percent of all the B stock
that is given by B to acquire all the stock of A. The boot ( that
is, the cash) N receives in this exchange would not be divi
dend since, after the transaction, N, as compared to the other
former shareholders of Corporation A, owns (1) less than 80
43. Secs. 302 through 304 describe the tax treatment of stock redemptions.
In a stock redemption, the corporation, in exchange for its own stock, dis
tributes cash or property to the shareholder in payment for the stock and
continues business as before. Ordinarily, a sale of stock would result in a
capital gain or loss to the selling shareholder if, as is the usual case, the
stock was a capital asset in his hands. However, if a redemption fails to
qualify for sale or exchange treatment under sec. 302 through 304, the
entire distribution will be treated as a dividend to the shareholder. Gener
ally, a redemption will qualify as a sale or exchange if all of a shareholder’s
stock is redeemed, if it is “substantially disproportionate,” or if it is “not
essentially equivalent to a dividend” (sec. 3 0 2 ). Special rules apply where
the stock of a corporation is redeemed by its sister corporation, where the
stock of a parent corporation is acquired by its subsidiary from a share
holder of the parent (sec. 3 0 4 ), or where the redeemed stock was included
in the estate of a decedent (sec. 3 0 3 ).
Section 305 deals with the taxation of stock dividends. Under section
306, the redemption, sale, or disposition of certain types of stock (usually
preferred stock previously issued as a nontaxable dividend) may result in
ordinary income.
44. Under sec. 3 0 2 (b ) ( 2 ) , a redemption is “substantially disproportionate”
(and thus not a dividend) only if (1 ) immediately after the redemption,
the ratio of the shareholder’s voting power (including voting preferred
stock) to the corporation’s total outstanding voting powers is less than 80
percent of such ratio immediately before the redemption (the same ratio
test must also be satisfied with regard to the company’s common stock,
voting and nonvoting), and (2 ) immediately after the redemption the
shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total voting power in the
company. The code does not quantify the “not essentially equivalent” test,
but it has proved difficult for taxpayers to meet.
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percent of his previous interest (45%/60% = 75%) and (2) less
than 50 percent of the common equity and voting power re
ceived for the equity in the transferred Corporation A. There
fore, any gain realized by N as a result of the transaction
would be treated as gain from a sale or exchange and recog
nized to the extent of cash received. If N realizes a loss, it
would not be recognized, since the transaction otherwise
meets the requirements for tax deferral.
If, on the other hand, N had given up 60 percent of the
stock of A and received 49 percent of the stock given by B in
the transaction (49%/60% is more than 80%), the boot received
by N would be taxable as a dividend, even though his interest
in the acquiring corporation (Corporation B) after the trans
action might be less than 1 percent (unless the reduction of
N’s proportionate ownership can qualify, under the particular
facts but without reference to N’s percentage ownership in
the acquiring corporation, as “not essentially equivalent to a
dividend” under section 302(b) ( 1 ) ) .45
2 . Amount o f dividend.

Where boot is to be treated as a dividend, we believe that
the rules for determining the amount of the dividend should
be changed. Currently, the amount treated as a dividend to
a shareholder upon the receipt of taxable boot is limited to
the lesser of (1) the gain recognized in the transaction or (2)
the shareholder’s ratable share of the accumulated earnings
and profits of the transferred corporation.46 Thus, a share
holder who gives up high-basis stock may have to report a
small dividend or none at all, while a shareholder with lowbasis stock may have a sizable dividend. This treatment is
quite different from that of an ordinary dividend, where the
only limitation on the taxable amount is the shareholder’s
share of earnings and profits, and where it is immaterial
whether his stock has appreciated or declined in value.
45. These proposed rules would not be affected by integration of individual
and corporate income taxes. However, if integration is adopted, dividend
treatment may become more attractive than sale or exchange treatment
(to the shareholder under the gross-up method, or to the corporation under
the dividends-paid deduction method). We believe that boot dividends
should be treated the same as regular dividends for integration purposes.
46. Sec. 3 5 6 (a ) (2 ).

32

We believe that regular and boot dividends should be
measured in the same manner. Therefore, we recommend that,
where the boot received by a shareholder in a reorganization
is to be treated as a dividend, the amount of such dividend
be the lesser of (1) the fair market value o f the boot received
(rather than the recognized gain) or (2) the shareholder’s
ratable share of accumulated earnings and profits.48 Any excess
of the fair market value of the boot received over the amount
taxable as a dividend would, under section 301 ( c ), be treated
as a return of capital and, to the extent it exceeds the trans
feror’s basis in the stock, as gain from the sale or exchange of
the stock.49
If the boot received by a shareholder in a reorganization
is, under our recommendations, to be treated as a dividend by
virtue of section 304 or 306, the shareholder’s ratable share of
accumulated earnings and profits would be calculated under
the rules of those s e c t i o n s . In
05 any other case, the accumu
lated earnings and profits to be used in arriving at the amount
of the dividend should be those of the corporation whose
stock was transferred, even though the boot came from the
acquiring corporation. The acquiring corporation would be
deemed to have contributed the boot property to the corpora
tion whose stock was transferred, and the boot property would
then be deemed to have been used by that corporation to
make a distribution to the transferor shareholder.
47. Currently, a regular dividend in property to a noncorporate taxpayer
is measured by its fair market value. The same dividend to a domestic
corporation is measured by the lesser of its fair market value or adjusted
basis in the hands of the distributing corporation [sec. 3 0 1 (b ) (1 ) (A)
and (B )]. A hoot dividend is measured by fair market value for all recipi
ents. We would retain this difference between regular and boot dividends
because of the administrative convenience of using fair market value for all
recipients of a boot dividend.
48. Currently, the amount of an ordinary dividend is limited to the corpora
tion’s current or accumulated earnings and profits, but the amount of a
boot dividend is limited to accumulated earnings and profits only. We
would retain this difference.
49. Our recommendations for treatment of boot dividends will usually
produce a higher tax liability than current law. However, if the acquired
corporation has low or no accumulated earnings and profits, our recom
mendations may produce a lower tax.
.50. Secs. 304(b)(2) and 306(a)(l)(A )(ii).
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Effects of Transaction: Acquiring Corporation
Recognition o f Gain or Loss. The acquiring corporation would
recognize gain or loss only if, and to the extent that, the fair
market value of boot given up by it differs from the acquiring
corporation’s tax basis in the boot property. The character of the
gain or loss to be recognized will depend upon the character the
boot property had in the hands of the acquiring corporation.
Basis and Holding Period o f the Acquired Equity
1. General rule
The acquiring corporation’s basis in the acquired equity
would be determined as under present law.51 It would be the
transferor’s basis, plus any dividend taxed to him and any gain
recognized by him in the transaction. Under section 1223(2),
the acquiring corporation’s holding period will include the
holding period of the transferor.
2. Optional method for determining basis
The general rule described above can produce unreason
able results. Often, the basis of the stock is much lower than
the tax basis of the underlying assets of the acquired corpora
tion. If, instead of getting stock, the acquiring corporation had
received the assets of the acquired company, it would gener
ally have a higher aggregate basis. Sometimes, this drawback
of a stock acquisition can be eliminated by a later liquidation
of the acquired subsidiary under section 332. However, where
legal or other considerations prevent liquidation of the ac
quired company, the acquiring company will be at a disad
vantage if it later sells the stock or if it files consolidated
returns that result in the creation of an excess loss account.52
In order to avoid discrimination against an acquiring cor
poration merely because it is not feasible to liquidate the
acquired corporation, we recommend a special basis rule
under which a corporation that acquires at least 80 percent
of the value of another corporation’s equity (excluding, for
this purpose, nonvoting, nonparticipating preferred stock)
could elect to claim, as basis for the acquired stock, its ratable
51. Sec. 3 6 2 (b ).
52. Regs. sec. 1.1502-14, -1 9 , and -32.
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share of the basis of the underlying assets less liabilities. We
recommend an 80 percent test because we believe that the
optional basis should be available only where enough equity
is acquired to make the economic eff ect of the transaction
similar to that of an acquisition of substantially all the assets.

Definitions and Special Rules
"Equity" Defined
Under our recommendations, the current law’s emphasis on
such terms as “voting stock,” “nonvoting stock,” and “securities”
shifts to the word “equity.” Only the equity of the transferee
corporation, for example, could be received tax-free by the trans
feror(s) in a business combination or incorporation. Similarly,
our proposed rules for determining whether the transaction itself
qualifies for tax deferral require the receipt and retention of a
minimum amount of the transferee’s equity.
We would define equity broadly to include any interest in
a corporation which is not, by virtue of its terms or of the cir
cumstances, a debt of the corporation. Normally, equity would
include—
1. Participating or nonparticipating, voting or nonvoting, con
vertible or nonconvertible, preferred or common s t o c k , and
35
2. Warrants and similar rights to acquire equity securities.
Numerous types of interests in a corporation have been de
signed and, given the ingenuity of corporate advisors, many more
can be designed that are neither clearly equity nor clearly debt.
Included in this group are sinking fund preferred stock, converti
ble bonds, and debt with attached privileges of acquiring an
equity interest. In this last type of instrument, the privilege of
acquiring an equity interest may or may not be severable from
the debt itself. We believe that the substance of such documents
rather than their form or title should prevail. We recommend

53. Except where the terms of the instrument are such as clearly to make
it in substance a corporate debt (e.g., nonvoting sinking fund preferred stock
with substantial security rights normally found only in corporate debt
instruments).
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that the following principles be applied in characterizing an
instrument:
1. Where a document is severable into two or more parts that
can be disposed of separately ( for example, a bond with war
rants attached) and severability is not delayed more than
one-fourth of the total period during which the document
might be expected to remain outstanding, the components of
the document should be separately characterized.54
2. In the interests of certainty and simplicity, documents that
include more than one right without severability ( for example,
convertible bonds) would need to be treated as either all debt
or all equity. We recommend an arbitrary rule that a con
vertible bond be deemed a debt, unless the conversion privi
lege accounts for at least one-fourth of the total value of the
document at the time of issuance. As a practical matter, it is
rare for a conversion privilege to account for as much as 25
percent of the value of the convertible bond at issuance.
The distinction between equity and debt will remain important
in the tax treatment of business combinations even if an integra
tion method is adopted. There are three events to consider: (1) the
receipt of equity or debt (as far as we are concerned here, the
receipt would normally be in a transaction described in part III
of subchapter C ), (2) the receipt of a return on equity or debt,
that is, dividend or interest ( there is clearly an important distinc
tion here except under the deduction method), and (3) the
extinguishment of equity or debt by way of redemption, liquida
tion, and so forth.
If a transferor of property or stock receives an interest in the
transferee corporation, the character of that interest as equity or
debt will determine how the transferor is taxed. If the transferor
receives boot taxable as a dividend, the dividend will be larger
54. Thus, if a twenty-year bond carries warrants detachable after five years
or less, the recipient would be treated as having received equity to the
extent of the value of the warrants and debt to the extent of the value of
the bond without the warrants.
This “one fourth of the time” test is an arbitrary one and some other
test might possibly be used. Some kind of test, however, would be neces
sary lest a document be merely disguised as severable, such as a bond with
warrants detachable in the nineteenth year of its twenty-year life.
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under the gross-up method than under the deduction or current
double-tax methods.
If a business combination or incorporation results in the ex
tinguishment of an interest in a corporation, the tax effect will
depend in part on whether the interest is debt or equity, with or
without integration.

Attribution Rules
The present reorganization provisions and section 351 differ
from most other tax rules for corporation-shareholder transactions
in that they disregard ( with very limited exceptions) the indirect
or “constructive” ownership of one corporation’s equity by another.
In order to recognize economic realities, we recommend the
adoption of attribution-of-ownership rules in determining the tax
treatment of incorporations and business combinations.
Attribution of ownership would be important in determining—
1. Whether stock of a parent company can be used by an acquir
ing corporation in exchange for stock or property.
2. Whether an acquiring corporation may transfer the acquired
properties or equity to a subsidiary corporation.
3. Whether the acquiring corporation has the required ownership
immediately after an exchange of equity for equity ( more than
50 percent under our recommendations).
4. Whether a transferor or transferors of less than a “business”
has the required ownership in the transferee in order to
qualify under section 351 (more than 50 percent under our
recommendations).
5. Whether equity transferred to, and retained by, a subsidiary
may be taken into account for our proposed 20 percent
continuity-of-interest test.
We believe that in determining whether a corporation may
use the stock of its parent in an acquisition and whether a corpo
ration may transfer acquired equity or property to a subsidiary,
(1) attribution should apply only within a chain of corporations
and (2) the test should be net voting power.
We believe that net voting power, rather than value, of equity
should be used in determining whether the attribution rules

37

apply. Attribution is appropriate where the corporations are an
economic entity; voting power appears to us to be the best indi
cator that they are such an entity. An acquiring corporation could
use the equity of a company that has net voting power (direct
and/or indirect) of more than 50 percent in the acquiring corpo
ration. Any such corporation would be a “parent” as that term is
used in this statement. Similarly, a corporation could transfer
acquired properties or equity to a corporation in which it holds
more than 50 percent net voting power. Such corporation would
be a “subsidiary.” In figure 1, the results would be these:
1. In an acquisition of assets or of another corporation’s equity,
E could use the equity of B (60% net voting power) or of A
(30% plus 60% of 60% = 66% net voting power). E could not
transfer acquired property or equity to any other corporation
because it has no subsidiary.
2. A, on the other hand, could use only its own equity for acquisi
tions because it has no parent but could transfer acquired
property or equity to E (66% net voting power), B (60% net
voting power), C (60% net voting power), or F (60% net
voting power) but not to D (60% of 100% of 60%, plus 60% of
20% = 48% net voting power).
3. B could use equity of A and could transfer to E, C, or D
(although A could not transfer to D ).
4. C could use equity of A or B and could transfer to D.
5. D could use equity of B or C but not A and has no subsidiary
to which it could transfer.
6. F could use equity of A but could not transfer to another
corporation.
7. G can use only its own equity and could transfer to H.
8. H can use G equity but could not transfer to any corporation.
On the other hand, for determining whether the more-than50%-in-value ownership test is met to qualify a section 351 trans
action or a stock-for-stock acquisition, the holdings of a group
of corporations should be aggregated. If the directly involved
corporation (the corporation with respect to which the test is
made) is one in a chain, the group would consist of all those
corporations in the chain that have more than 50 percent net
voting power in the involved corporation plus all those in which
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the involved corporation has more than 50 percent net voting
power. It would also include all corporations outside the chain
(sister corporations) in which any group member inside the
chain holds more than 50 percent net voting power. For example,
in figure 1 the results would be these:
1. A could count the holdings of E, B, C, and F in addition to
its own but could not count D’s holdings. (A’s net voting
power in D is only 48 percent.)
2 . E could add to its own holdings those of B and A as members

of its chain, plus F ’s holdings (because of A’s voting power
over F ), plus those of C and D (because of B’s voting power
over C and C’s voting power over D ).
B or C could count the holdings of A, E, D, and F in addition
to their own respective holdings.
F could count the holdings of A, B, E, and C but not D.
D could count only the holdings of C, B, and E.
The holdings of G and H would be aggregated, but they could
not include the holdings of any other corporation.
FIGURE 1

Percentages Refer to Voting Power
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A corporation could, under these rules, be a member of more
than one group. Referring to the immediately preceding example,
E, for instance, can be a member of groups A, B, C, F, and E or
of groups E, A, B, C, D, and F or of groups D, C, B, and E.

Effect of Integration on Recommendations
Our recommendations would not be changed by the adoption
of integration, which would affect only the tax results of those
reorganizations in which boot is taxed as a dividend. We recom
mend that, for integration purposes, boot dividends and regular
dividends be treated in the same manner, consistent with our
view that boot dividends should be characterized and measured
under the same rules as regular dividends.
Shareholders W ho R eceive Boot
Under the gross-up method, the shareholder’s taxable dividend
may exceed the value of the boot received, with a tax credit for
the excess. That may make dividend treatment more attractive to
some shareholders than sale or exchange treatment. Under the
deduction method, the shareholder’s tax is not changed, but the
corporation that is deemed to have distributed the dividend will
obtain a tax benefit. This benefit will normally be taken into
account in the negotiations that lead to the reorganization, so
that indirectly the shareholder(s) may be benefitted.
Distributing Corporation
Under the gross-up method, the boot dividend does not affect
the distributing corporation at all.
Under the deduction method, the corporation may obtain a
sizable deduction, for a boot dividend will often be larger than
a regular one. If the distributor corporation remains in existence,
it can be expected to have an opportunity to use the deduction,
especially if it can be carried back or forward in some manner.
If the distributor corporation disappears as part of the plan of
reorganization, it may not be able to use the deduction against
its own current and prior years’ income. In this case, we recom
mend that the unused portion be made available as a carryover
to the acquiring corporation(s).
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Formation and Combination
of Noncorporate
Business Enterprises
We believe that the present partnership rules of subchapter K
generally provide enough flexibility for the combination of two
or more unincorporated businesses, whether previously conducted
as partnerships or sole proprietorships. We recommend only two
changes.

Continuation of Partnerships in a Partnership
Merger
When two or more partnerships merge, the present law usually
treats the smaller partnership(s) or, in some cases, all of them
as terminated. This treatment can produce adverse tax results.5
5
We recommend that the resulting partnership be treated as a
continuation of all constituent partnerships. The combined part
nership should probably be required to adopt the taxable year
of the largest constituent partnership or proprietorship.

Carryover of Tax Attributes and Certain Credits
We believe that any tax characteristics associated with a
transferred business,56 whether that business was previously con
ducted as a partnership or as a sole proprietorship, should be
carried over to the continuing partnership, just as the tax attri
butes of a transferred corporate business would be carried over
under our foregoing recommendations.57
55. For example, the use of accelerated methods of depreciation is generally
available only to the original user of the property. The distributee partners
may not use accelerated depreciation with respect to property distributed
to them nor may a successor partnership [reg. secs. 1 .1 6 7 ( c ) - 1 (a)(6) and
1.708-1 (b )(2)].
56. As distinguished from the tax characteristics associated with the former
owners of the transferred business or with other property of the transferors.
57. See “Carryover of Tax Attributes,” above.
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APPENDIX

Current Taxation of the
Formation and Combination
of Corporate Businesses
A general rule of taxation is that any exchange is a taxable event
unless exem pted by a special provision.1 The code provisions that p er
mit nontaxable incorporations and reorganizations are among these ex
ceptions. To achieve non taxability, a transaction must comply with the
precise requirements of the code and with their intent, otherwise it re
mains taxable. If a transaction fails to achieve nontaxability, some or
all of the parties will have to recognize gain or loss in the year it is
carried out, even though it might appear that there was only a slight
change in the taxpayer’s econom ic situation.2
In a reorganization or incorporation, it is not always to the tax
payer’s advantage to have a nontaxable transaction. Such a transaction
does not exempt the realized gain from taxation; it merely d efers it to
an indefinite future time when it is realized in a taxable transaction. In

N O TE: The sole purpose of the Appendix is to provide background information
as an aid to understanding the proposals of this Tax Policy Statement. Although
it may suggest lines of research, such research should be pursued in other ap
propriate sources.
1. The federal income tax treatment of gains and losses from property dispositions
is controlled by a number of statutory provisions. Gains derived from a taxpayer’s
dealings in property are included in the taxpayer’s income under sec. 6 1 (a )
( 3 ) , while losses sustained in such transactions are, with certain limitations, de
ductible. The mere appreciation or depreciation in the value of property does not
generally constitute a presently taxable event. When property is disposed of
through sale, exchange, destruction, etc., the amount of the taxpayer’s realized
gain or loss is determined by the difference between the value of what he receives
in the transaction for the property and its adjusted basis. Sec. 1 0 0 1 (c ) requires
him to recognize this gain or loss unless some other provision in the statute pro
vides otherwise.
2. See, for example, U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1 9 2 1 ), 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶54;
Rockefeller v. U.S., 257 U.S. 176 (1 9 2 1 ), 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶55; and Marr v. U.S.,
268 U.S. 536 ( 1 9 2 5 ), 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶137.
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the meantime, the unrecognized gain is preserved in a lower basis for
the property received by the taxpayer, that is, lower than its fair market
value. D eferral permits taxpayers to consummate exchanges in which
an investment is merely changed into another form and in which they
do not receive funds with which to pay the often very large tax liability
that would arise if the transaction were taxable. On the other hand, in
a nontaxable transaction loss is also deferred (in the form of a basis
higher than fair m arket valu e). If the exchange involves appreciated
property, not only will the transferor have low-basis-high-value prop
erty after the exchange, but the transferee will also have low-basishigh-value property because the property it receives will keep the low
basis it had in the transferor’s hands. Therefore, the government may
eventually collect two taxes on the same appreciation.

Transfers to Controlled Corporations
The purchase of a new or existing corporation’s stock or securities
for cash ordinarily results in no immediate tax consequences to the a c 
quiring taxpayer. Often, however, corporate stock or securities are a c
quired with property other than cash. A proprietorship or a partnership
may decide to incorporate a going business. A taxpayer or group of tax
payers may contribute property to create a new business in corporate
form or to enlarge an existing corporation. Because property, rather
than cash, is given in exchange for the stock or securities of the co r
porate transferee, and because the value of the stock or securities usually
differs from the transferor’s basis in the contributed property, gain or
loss is realized by the transferor as a result of the exchange. Section 351
provides for an indefinite postponement, but not elimination, of the
taxable recognition of the gain or the loss arising from transactions that
satisfy its requirements.

Background and Purpose of Section 351
The earliest predecessor of the present-day section 351 was section
202(e)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921. The express purpose of this
provision was to “eliminate . . . technical constructions which were
economically unsound,” and thereby to facilitate required business ad 
justments.3 Prior to 1921, for instance, the creation of even a one-man

3. H. Rept. 350 and S. Rept. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921; reprinted in J. S.
Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income and Excess Profits Tax Laws,
1861—1938 (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 3 8 ), pp. 7 9 0 -7 9 1 .
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corporation through the transfer of appreciated or depreciated property
to the new corporation for all of its capital stock gave rise to a taxable
gain or a deductible loss.
- The basic premise of the 1921 forerunner of section 351 was de
scribed by the court in Portland Oil Company v. Comm.:
It is the purpose of [section 351] to save the taxpayer from an imme
diate recognition of a gain, or to intermit the claim of a loss, in certain
transactions where a gain or loss may have accrued in a constitutional
sense, but where in a popular or economic sense there has been a mere
change in the form of ownership and the taxpayer has not really “cashed
in” on a theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture.4

In another early decision, the court stated:
[A transaction qualifying under section 351] effects a change in form,
but not in substance, of the beneficial interests of the transferors in the
transferred property. The transaction . . . lacks a distinguishing charac
teristic of a sale, in that, instead of having the effect of terminating or
extinguishing the beneficial interests of the transferors in the transferred
property after . . . the transaction the transferors continue to be bene
ficially interested in the transferred property and have dominion over
it by virtue of their control of the new corporate owner. . .5

With relatively few substantive changes and only minor differences
in language, a provision similar to the one originally adopted in the
1921 act has, without interruption, been a part of the tax law for the
past fifty-eight years.

Basic Statutory Scheme
Under the general rule of section 351(a), no gain or loss is recog
nized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock or securities of the transferee corporation
and if, “immediately after the exchange,” the transferor or transferors
are “in control” of the corporation. The property may be transferred to
create a new corporation or to enlarge an existing corporation. In either
case the transferors, to be “in control” of the corporation, must collec
tively own (1) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and (2) at least 80 percent of the
total number of shares of all other classes of the transferee corporation’s
4. 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1 9 4 0 ), 4 0 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9234.
5. American Compress and W arehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1934),
4 U.S. Tax Cas. P 2 8 3 .
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stock.6 The transferee corporation recognizes neither a gain nor a loss
upon the issuance of its stock or securities in exchange for money or
other property.7
Transferors M ust Collectively M eet the Control R eq uirem en t
W hen only one person transfers property to the corporation, that
person must be in control of the transferee immediately after the ex
change for the transfer to qualify under section 351. If two or more
transferors participate in the same transaction, however, the tax law
looks to the stock ownership of the group of transferors to determine
w hether the required post-transaction control exists.8 In either case,
both the stock acquired in the transfer itself and any stock already
owned by the tran sfero r(s) before the exchange is taken into account
in computing control.9
Under section 351, stock or securities issued for the perform ance of
services are not considered as having been issued for “property.” Since
only the stock ownership of the transferors who exchange property for
the stock or securities of the transferee is taken into account in de
termining w hether the control requirem ent has been satisfied, any p er
son who transfers only services is not considered a part of the group of
transferors in applying this test.10
6. Section 3 6 8 ( c ). Prior to 1954, gain or loss realized in an exchange involving
two or more transferors would go unrecognized only if “the amount of stock and
securities received by each [transferor was] substantially in proportion to his
interest in the property prior to the exchange.” Violation of this requirement would
lead to the full recognition of gain or loss by all parties to the exchange. This
requirement was eliminated in 1954. Under current law, section 351 is to be
applied regardless of any disproportionate share of stock or securities received by
a transferor in the exchange. If there is a disproportionate distribution in a section
351 exchange, “the transaction may be treated as if the stock or securities had
first been received in proportion [to the value of the property transferred], and
then some of such stock and securities had been used to make gifts, to pay com
pensation, or to satisfy obligations of the transferor . . .” [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (b )(1 )].
7. Sec. 1 0 3 2 (a ).
8. It is not necessary for each transferor to convey property to the transferee corpo
ration at the same time in order for there to be a group of transferors. A group
of transferors includes those parties whose respective rights and obligations are
defined prior to the transaction and whose transfers are made within a reasonable
time of each other pursuant to one plan [reg. sec. 1.3 5 1 -1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ] .
9. Reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (a ) ( 1 ) . The regulations provide that an existing shareholder
shall not be treated as a part of the group of transferors if the amount of property
transferred by him is of relatively small value in comparison to the value of stock
he already owns and if the primary purpose of the transfer is to enable the ex
changes of the other transferor(s) to qualify for tax-free treatment under section
351 [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 ( a ) ( 1 ) (ii)].
10. Where a particular transferor receives stock or securities in exchange for both
property and services, the entire amount of the stock owned by such transferor
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One of the most troublesome questions in section 351 transactions
is w hether control of the transferee corporation exists “immediately
after” the exchange in those cases where the transferors subsequently
lose c o n t r o l . 1The statutory requirement that the transferors must be
in control of the corporation “immediately after the exchange” at first
glance appears to focus upon a particular point in time, to the exclu
sion of any requirement that the control must persist. It is generally
recognized that momentary control is not enough if the transferors
agreed before the exchange to transfer enough of their stock to lose
control of the transferee or if such a transfer was an integral part of the
plan under which the exchange was m ade.12
R eceipt of Boot
If the transferors as a gro up have satisfied the control requirement,
the next question is whether the gain realized by a particular transferor
is to be nontaxable—that is, did the transferor receive “solely stock or
securities” of the transferee corporation in exchange for property?13
W here a transferor receives cash or other property in addition to stock
or securities of the transferee, section 3 5 1 (b ) requires that any gain,
but not loss, realized by such transferor be recognized to the extent of
the “boot” ( that is, amount of cash plus the fair m arket value of other
after the transaction is counted in determining whether the group of property
transferors has control of the corporation. If a relatively small amount of property
is transferred merely as a device for enabling the parties who actually transfer
property to qualify under section 351, this rule does not apply. The value of stock
received for services is taxable as ordinary income even if section 351 does apply
[reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 ( a ) ( 1 ) (ii) and (a ) ( 2 ) example ( 3 ) ] .
11. Under section 3 5 1 ( c ) , the fact that a corporate transferor immediately dis
tributes the stock it receives in a sec. 351 exchange to its shareholders is ignored
in determining whether the transferors are in control “immediately after” the
exchange.
12. See Boris Bittker and James Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corpora
tions and Shareholders, 3d ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1971, pp.
3 -3 2 — 3 -3 8 .
13. The term stock refers to an equity interest in a corporation. For purposes of
sec. 351, the stock can be common or preferred, voting or nonvoting. Stock rights
and stock warrants, however, are excluded from the definition of stock by reg. sec.
1.351-1 (a ) ( 1 ) . The term security refers to an evidence of indebtedness of the
corporation, but not all corporate obligations are securities within the meaning
of sec. 351. Although it has been said that an “overall evaluation of the nature
of [a] debt” is required to distinguish between a corporate obligation that is a
security and one that is not (C am p W olters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737 (1 9 5 4 ),
aff’d 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1 9 5 6 ) 5 6 -1 U.S. Tax Gas. 1(9314), the length of
time to maturity is by far the most important consideration. Corporate notes,
bonds, debentures, etc., that fall due within five years or less will rarely qualify as
securities, while obligations with maturities of ten years or more probably will.
The status of obligations with terms of between five and ten years is less certain.
Other factors, such as listing on an exchange, can also be important.
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property) r e c e i v e d . 14Because stock or securities issued for services are
not treated as having been issued for property, they cannot be received
tax free in a transaction that otherwise qualifies under section 351. The
person who has rendered or will render such services must recognize
ordinary income to the extent of the fair market value of the stock or
securities received for the services.15

Corporate Assumption of Transferor Liabilities
The relief from a liability ( or the disposition of property subject to
a liability) is generally treated as the equivalent of cash received. Sec
tion 3 5 7 ( a ) , however, provides an exception to this rule. If, in a section
351 exchange, the transferee corporation assumes a liability of the trans
feror or takes property subject to a liability, this direct or indirect re
lief from the debt is not generally treated as “other property or money”
( i.e., b oot) received by the transferor.16 There are two exceptions to this
rule:
1. If, taking into account the nature of the liability and the circum 
stances under which the assumption or acquisition was made, the

14. For example, X transfers property having an adjusted basis of $20,000 and a
fair market value of $25,000 to Z Corporation in exchange for 250 shares of the
corporation’s stock (valued at $100 per share). In the same transaction Y transfers
property having an adjusted basis of $50,000 and a fair market value of $85,000
in exchange for 800 shares of Z Corporation stock and $5,000 in cash. Together,
X and Y own 100 percent of Z Corporation’s outstanding stock and therefore
satisfy the control requirement of section 351. Since X received no boot, no part
of his realized gain of $5,000 is recognized. Y’s realized gain of $35,000 must be
recognized to the extent of the boot ($ 5 ,0 0 0 in cash) he received. Had Y instead
received $40,000 in cash and only 450 shares of stock, his recognized gain would
have been limited to his realized gain of $35,000.
In determining the character of the recognized gain, reference must generally
be made to the character of the transferred assets. According to the regulations, a
distribution by a corporation of its stock or securities “in connection with an
exchange subject to Section 3 5 1 ( a ) ” may, in some cases, have “the effect of the
distribution of a taxable dividend” [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -2 (d )]. For example, a dividend
could result when property is transferred to an existing corporation in exchange
for stock, securities, or boot having greater value [reg. sec. 1.301—1 ( j ) ] .
15. See n. 10, supra.
16. Prior to 1938, this treatment—although it had not yet received statutory
sanction—was widely accepted as consistent with the spirit of sec. 351 and certain
analogous reorganization provisions. However, in U.S. v. H end ler, 303 U.S. 564
(1 9 3 8 ), 3 8 -1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶1215, the Supreme Court ruled that the assumption
and payment of the transferor’s liabilities by the transferee corporation were tanta
mount to the receipt of money and, therefore, constituted taxable boot to the
transferor. Congress, primarily concerned with the adverse effect that the H endler
decision might have upon the usefulness of sec. 351 and certain reorganization
provisions, reacted to the decision by enacting the provisions now embodied,
with minor changes, in sec. 3 5 7 (a ) and (b ).
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transferor’s principal purpose for such an arrangem ent was the avoid
ance of federal income tax on the transaction or was not a bona fide
business purpose, all liabilities will be treated as “boot” even if only
one of them is so “tainted.”17
2.

If, with respect to a particular transferor, the total liabilities as
sumed by the transferee plus the total liabilities to which the trans
ferred property is subject exceed the transferor’s aggregate basis in
the properties transferred, the transferor must recognize gain to the
extent of such excess.18

Basis and Holding Period of Property
Received in a Section 351 Exchange
The purpose of section 351 (an d certain analogous reorganization
provisions) is to permit the postponement, rather than the elimination,
of the gain or loss realized but not recognized at the time of the ex
change. This deferral is accom plished by preserving such gain or loss
in the bases of the assets acquired by both the transferor and the trans
feree in the exchange. If the exchange does not involve boot or an as
sumption of, or transfer subject to, liabilities, the transferor’s basis in
the property transferred “carries over” to becom e ( 1 ) the transferor/
shareholder’s basis in his newly acquired stock or securities and ( 2 )
the transferee corporation’s basis in the property it receives in the ex-

17. Sec. 3 5 7 (b )(1 ). This exception is directed primarily against transferors who
borrow money immediately before a sec. 351 exchange with the intention of keep
ing the loan proceeds and then shifting the responsibility for repayment to the
transferee corporation. When an existing proprietorship or partnership with
liabilities created in the ordinary course of business is incorporated, the transferor(s) should have little diff iculty proving a proper business purpose for their
transfer. Section 3 5 7 (b ) is much more likely to apply when the transferred lia
bility was created shortly before the exchange. Note that in any suit or proceeding
in which the applicability of sec. 3 5 7 (b ) is at issue, the transferor of such lia
bility or liabilities must, under the statute, prove a proper business purpose by a
“clear preponderance of the evidence” [sec. 3 5 7 (b )(2 )].
18. Sec. 3 5 7 ( c ). Assume, for example, that a transferor transfers to a corporation
( 1 ) a building having an adjusted basis of $20,000 and a fair market value of
$60,000, subject to a mortgage of $50,000, and ( 2 ) land having an adjusted basis
of $15,000 and a fair market value of $25,000. In the exchange, which qualifies
under section 351, he receives ( 1 ) stock of the transferee valued at $35,000 and
( 2 ) the transferee's assumption of the $50,000 mortgage. His realized gain under
Section 1001 is $50,000 (value of stock received plus liability relieved less his
bases in the land and the building), of which $15,000 (mortgage less bases of
the land and the building) is presently recognized and taxed under sec. 3 5 7 ( c ).
The recognition of the remaining $35,000 gain is postponed under sec. 3 5 1 (a )
until such time as the transferor disposes of the stock in a taxable transaction.
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change.19 W hen boot is received or liabilities are assumed, adjustments
to the transferor’s basis are required.
T ra n sfero rs Basis in Stock, Securities, and Boot R eceived
The transferor’s basis in the stock or securities ( “nonrecognition
property” ) received is his basis in the property transferred minus the
amount of money and the market value of any “other property” (boot)
received, m inus any liability assumed by the corporation or to which
the transferred property was subject (unless the liabilities were in
cluded in the b o o t), plus any gain recognized, and plus any dividend
taxed to him. His basis in the other property (or boot) is that property’s
market value on the date of the transaction.20
W hen the transferor disposes of the stock or securities received un
der section 3 5 1 ( a ) , he determines his holding period by including the
period during which he held the property transferred, provided the
transferred property was either a capital asset or depreciable or real
property used in the transferor’s trade or business and held for more
than one year at the time of the transfer (th a t is, section 1231 prop
erty ) .21 The transferor’s holding period for stock or securities received
for any other assets, as well as his holding period for any boot received
in the exchange, begins on the date of the exchange.
T ra nsferee C orporations Basis in Property R eceived
The transferee corporation’s basis in the property received in a sec
tion 351 exchange is the transferor’s basis, plus the gain recognized by,
and any dividend taxed to, the transferor on the exchange.22 Thus,
where the exchange is tax free to the transferor, the corporation “steps
into the shoes” of the transferor, with each asset retaining in the hands
of the corporation the same basis it had in the hands of the trans
feror immediately before the exchange.23 The corporation’s holding
19. Secs. 358 and 362. For example, X, in an exchange qualifying under sec. 351,
transfers property having an adjusted basis of $30,000 and a fair market value of
$50,000 to Z Corporation in exchange for 500 shares of its stock (valued at $100
a share). X ’s basis in the stock he acquires is $30,000. Z Corporation’s basis in
the property is also $30,000. X ’s realized gain of $20,000 is not recognized at the
time of the transaction, but if he later sells this stock for $50,000, his taxable
gain at that time would be $20,000. If the transferor receives more than one
item that can be received tax free (e.g., common and preferred stock), his basis
is allocated among them in the ratio of their values [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 8 -2 (b ) ( 2 ) ] .
20. Sec. 3 5 8 (a ) and ( d ) .
21. Sec. 1 2 2 3 (1 ).
22. Sec. 3 6 2 (a ).
23. Note that the depreciation recapture potential of any sec. 1245 or sec. 1250
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period includes the period during which the property was held by the
transferee.24

"Acquisition-Type'' Corporate Reorganizations
Exchanges of property in connection with corporate combinations,
acquisitions, separations, and structural readjustments can be fully tax
able or wholly or partly nontaxable. If the transaction is to be nontaxable to the corporations involved and their respective shareholders, it
must satisfy the very technical requirements of the statute and meet
certain judicially developed, nonstatutory criteria (for example, “c on
tinuity of interest” and “business purpose” tests).
F o r income tax purposes, section 3 6 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) defines the term re 
organization to include only the following transactions:
(A )
(B )

(C )

(D )

(E )
(F )

a statu tory m erger or consolidation;
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchan ge solely for all or a
p art of its voting stock (o r in exchan ge solely for all or a p art of
the voting stock of a corporation w hich is in control of the acq u ir
ing co rp o ratio n ), of stock of another corporation if, im m ediately
after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such
other corporation (w h eth er or not such acquiring corporation had
control im m ediately before the acq u isitio n );
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchan ge solely for all or a
p art of its voting stock (o r in exchan ge solely for all or a p art of
the voting stock of a corporation w hich is in control of the acq u ir
ing co rp o ratio n ), of substantially all of the properties of another
corporation, b ut in determ ining w hether th e exch an ge is solely
for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability
of th e other, or th e fa c t th at p rop erty acqu ired is subject to a
liability, shall be disregarded;
a transfer b y a corporation of all or a p art of its assets to another
corporation if im m ediately after the transfer the transferor, or one
or m ore of its shareholders (including persons who w ere share
holders im m ediately before th e tra n sfe r), or any com bination
thereof, is in control of the corporation to w hich the assets are
transferred; b ut only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities
of the corporation to w hich the assets are tran sferred are dis
tributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 3 5 4 , 3 5 5 ,
or 3 5 6 ;
a recap italization; or
a m ere chan ge in identity, form , or p lace of organization, how ever
effected.

property received by the transferee corporation, which is attributable to deprecia
tion taken by the transferor on such property prior to the exchange, is “carried
over” with the property.
24. Sec. 1 2 2 3 (2 ).
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These six types of reorganizations are commonly designated by the subparagraph letter identifying each: type A, type B, type C, type D, type
E , and type F .
In general, types A and C are “fusion,” or acquisition-type, trans
actions used to combine the assets of two or more corporations ( w hether
previously independent or affiliated); type B is also an acquisitive re 
organization and is used to acquire a subsidiary. A type D reorganiza
tion, on the other hand, may be used to combine two affiliated corpora
tions, to “reincorporate,” or to effect a corporate separation; and types
E and F are changes in the structure of a single corporation.

History of the Reorganization Concept
The 1913 law contained no exception to the rule that every disposi
tion of property is a taxable event. In the early cases, the courts fol
lowed the strict letter of the law and applied this rule even to purely
paper transactions. L ater Congress decided that certain transactions
should not be taxed because they were nothing more than readjust
ments in a corporate business enterprise or the substitution of one item
for another that was actually the same thing in different guise. Thus
began a lengthy process of evolution to establish the degree of con
tinuity of interest, form, or substance necessary to justify postponement
of tax on the theory that the exchange was actually only one phase of
a continuing transaction. During this evolutionary process, the courts
followed Congress but added their own requirements for sound busi
ness purpose, corporate purpose, net econom ic effect, and reality of
transactions.

The First Reorganization Legislation
The Revenue Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 made no specific refer
ence to exchanges of property other than to stipulate that the term
incom e included gains and profits derived from “sales” or “dealings” in
property. Consequently, no definition of reorganization was to be found
in these early laws, and such transactions w ere autom atically taxable.25

25. From 1921 to 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a number of important
reorganization cases—all of which were subject to the pre-1918 rules. Even though
the transactions made only a change in form and not in the underlying economic
relationships of the parties, all but one of these cases held the transactions taxable.
For a brief analysis of these decisions, see Robert S. Holzman, Corporate Reorga
nizations: Their Federal Tax Status (New York, The Ronald Press Company,
1 9 5 5 ), pp. 2 - 6 through 2 -1 0 .
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It was not until 1918 that, because of econom ic changes and increased
corporate tax rates brought on by the war, Congress deemed it neces
sary to provide for the treatm ent of reorganizations.
The Revenue Act of 1918 provided the first express rules for the tax
treatm ent of “exchanges” of property. One provision exempted from
recognition of present gain or loss the exchange of stock or securities
for new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value in
connection with a reorganization, merger, or consolidation.26 The a c 
tual meaning of “reorganization,” however, was not defined in the statute
itself and thus had to be drawn from context or from the ordinary
usage. Although the Treasury D epartm ent attem pted to fill the defini
tional void,27 the Revenue Act of 1918 was of little use to taxpayers
because of the uncertainty about the meaning of its terms and because
of the vast importance given to par values, which have little, if any, re
lation to true value.
Yet postwar readjustments made the need for definite reorganiza
tion provisions more im portant than ever, and Congress was urged to
correct the 1918 statute so as to “permit business to go forward with the
readjustments required by existing conditions.”28 As a result, Congress
enacted the first comprehensive attem pt to deal with the problem of
26. Sec. 2 0 2 (b ) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that “when property is
exchanged for other property, the property received in exchange shall, for the
purpose of determining gain or loss, be treated as the equivalent of cash to the
amount of its fair market value, if any; but when, in connection with the re
organization, merger, or consolidation, a person receives in place of stock or
securities owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or
face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the
new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock,
or securities, or property exchanged. When, in the case of any such reorganization,
merger, or consolidation, the aggregate par or face value of the new stock or
securities received is in excess of the aggregate par or face value of the stock
or securities exchanged, a like amount in par or face value of the new stock or
securities shall be treated as taking the place of the stock or securities exchanged,
and the amount of the excess in par or face value shall be treated as a gain to
the extent that the fair market value of the new stock or securities is greater than
the cost the stock or securities exchanged.”
27. In T.D. 2870 (1919, unpublished), the following intercorporate transactions
were interpreted as falling within the scope of a “reorganization” : “In general,
where two ( or m ore) corporations unite their properties by either ( a ) the dissolu
tion of corporation B and the sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b ) the sale
of its property by B to A and the dissolution of B, or ( c ) the sale of stock of
B to A and the dissolution of B, or ( d ) the merger of B into A, or ( e ) the con
solidation of the corporations, no taxable income is received from the transaction
by A or B or the stockholders of either, provided the sole consideration received
by B and its stockholders in ( a ) , (b ) , ( c ) , and (d ) is stock and securities of
A, and by A and B and their stockholders in (e ) is stock or securities of the
consolidated corporation, in any case of no greater aggregate par or face value
than the old stock or securities surrendered.”
28. See n. 3, supra.
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corporate reorganizations. Section 2 0 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) of the Revenue Act of
1921 provided the following:
. . . no gain or loss shall be recognized when in the reorganization of one
or m ore corporations a person receives in p lace of any stock or securities
owned by him, stock or securities in a corporation a p arty to or resulting
from such reorganization. T h e w ord “reorganization,” as used in this
p aragraph , includes a m erger or consolidation (including the acquisi
tion by one corporation of at least a m ajority of the voting stock and at
least a m ajority of the total num ber of shares of all other classes of
stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of
another co rp o ratio n ), recapitalization, or m ere change in identity, form ,
or p lace of organization (h ow ever effected ).

N ot only did this provision for the first time define reorganization,
it also broadened the exemption provided in the 1918 Revenue Act,
and it abandoned the par value idea. Unfortunately, the act also opened
avenues for numerous tax avoidance schemes. Under the statutory def
inition of a reorganization, for example, a purchase by one corporation
of a majority of the shares of all classes of stock of another corporation
(or of substantially all the properties of another corporation) was a re
organization, even where the consideration for such stock (o r prop
erties) was cash. Although other provisions in the revenue act p re
cluded the nonrecognition of gain if the sale was for cash, short-term
notes could be used and would be considered "securities” for the pur
pose of satisfying the conditions for nonrecognition. Consequently, un
til the enactm ent of the Revenue A ct of 1934 and the subsequent de
velopment of the “continuity of interest” doctrine, short-term notes
were often given in sales transactions.

Development of a Realistic Concept
Under the Revenue Act of 1924, the statutory definition of a re
organization was refined and began to resemble the current statutory
definition. Section 2 0 3 (h ) of the act provided the following:
( 1 ) T h e term “reorganization” means (A ) a m erger or consolidation
(including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a m ajority
of the voting stock and at least a m ajority of the total num ber of
shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or sub
stantially all the properties of another co rp o ratio n ), or ( B ) a
transfer by a corporation of all or a p a rt of its assets to another
corporation if im m ediately after the transfer the transferor or its
stockholders, or both, are in control of the corporation to w hich
the assets w ere transferred, or (C ) a recapitalization, or (D ) a
m ere change in identity, form or p lace of organization, how ever
effected.
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(2 )

T h e term “a p arty to a reorganization” includes a corporation re 
sulting from a reorganization and includes both corporations in the
case of an acquisition by one corporation of at least a m ajority of
the voting stock and at least a m ajority of the total num ber of shares
of all other classes of another corporation.

Control was defined to mean “the ownership of at least 80 per centum
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.”29
This modification of the reorganization provisions was part of an
overall plan formulated by then Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W .
Mellon. The plan, referred to as the “Mellon plan,” provided for a
general reduction of income taxes and a complete revision of the tax
law to place it on a sounder basis with respect to the prevailing busi
ness and economic environment. Econom ic disruption of business was
viewed as avoidable only if “taxes were put on a reasonable basis that
(w ould) permit business to go on and industry develop.”30 This “nondisruptive,” or “neutrality,” concept of tax policy continues to provide
the theoretical cornerstone upon which subsequent reorganization pro
visions rest.
It was not until 1934, after several tax avoidance schemes using the
mechanisms of the reorganization provisions had developed, that the
statute was again modified. The Revenue Act of 1934 was directed at
preventing three major categories of abuse: the tax-free sale of assets
framed as a reorganization, the tax-free distribution of corporate earn
ings and profits, and the strategic transfer of favorable basis from one
asset to another just prior to sale.31 Under the 1934 act, a “reorganiza
tion” included the following:
(A ) a statu tory m erger or consolidation, or (B ) the acquisition by one
corporation in exchan ge solely for all or p art of its voting stock, of at
least 8 0 p er centum of the voting stock and at least 8 0 per centum of
the total num ber of shares of all other classes of stock of another
corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another corporation,
or (C ) a transfer by a corporation of all or a p art of its assets to
another corporation if im m ediately after the transfer the transferor or
its stockholders or both are in control of th e corporation to w hich the
assets are transferred, or (D ) a recapitalization, or ( E ) a m ere change
in identity, form , or p lace of organization, how ever effected.32

29. Revenue Act of 1924, sec. 2 0 3 (i).
30. Sheldon S. Cohen, “Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation,” American Bar Asso
ciation Journal 55 ( January 1 9 6 9 ): 41.
31. Milton Sandburg, “The Income Tax Subsidy to Reorganizations,” Columbia
Law Review 38 (1 9 3 8 ) : 116.
32. Revenue Act of 1934, sec. 1 1 2 (g ).
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The important differences betw een the pre-1934 and the 1934 defini
tions of tax-free reorganization can be summarized as follows:

1. The addition of the word “statutory” as a qualification of “merger
or consolidation,” which restricts the types of transactions falling
within the definition of a tax-free reorganization.

2. The elimination of the parenthetical inclusion of an acquisition as
a m erger or consolidation.
3. The recognition of an acquisition of shares or assets as distinguished
from a m erger or consolidation by the word “or.”
4. The limitation of “acquisition” by the words “in exchange solely for
all or a part of its voting stock.”
W hile these statutory changes did not eliminate the abuses, they com 
bined with the developing body of judicial precedent to narrow sub
stantially the scope of imagined and actual tax avoidance opportunities
available through the use of corporate reorganizations.

Early Case Law and the Development of
Judicial Limitations
F aced with the rudim entary provisions of the early reorganization
statutes, the courts reacted to protect the spirit of the legislation by
segregating sales and disguised dividends from true reorganizations.
These protective instincts of the courts, over the years, resulted in the
formulation of additional, extrastatutory criteria for evaluating the
validity of reorganization transactions. They are usually referred to as
the “continuity of interest,” “sound business purpose,” “corporate busi
ness purpose,” and “step transaction” doctrines. W hile the statutes that
evoked these protective remedies have been revised many times over
the intervening years, these court-m ade rules continue to control the
application of the present-day statute.

The "Continuity of Interest" Doctrine
Although the Revenue A ct of 1924 removed some of the more ob
vious loopholes of the 1921 act, the lack of controls with respect to
consideration remained. As a result, the courts created and developed
the important “continuity of interest” test to close loopholes in the stat
utory formula. In Cortland Specialty Co. v. Com missioner, it was held
that promissory notes payable in 14 months did not qualify as “securi
ties.” The court said—
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In defining “reorganization,” the R evenue A ct gives the widest room
for all kinds of changes of corporate stru ctu re, b ut does not abandon the
prim ary requisite th at th ere m ust be som e continuity of interest on the
p art of the transferor corporation or its stockholders in order to secure
exem ption. R eorganization presupposes continuance of business under
modified corp orate forms.33

The court arrived at a similar result in Pinellas Ic e and C old Stor
age Co. V. C om m .34 In D ecem ber 1926, Pinellas transferred 99 percent
of its net assets to the Florida Company in exchange for $400,000 in
cash and $1 million in collateral notes due on April 1, 1927. Pinellas
distributed the cash and, as the notes w ere paid off, the note proceeds
to its shareholders. The company was then dissolved. The court held
this transaction to be a taxable sale and not a reorganization:
T he m ere purch ase for m oney of the assets of one com pany by another
is beyond the evident purpose of the provision, and has no real sem 
blance to a m erger or consolidation. Certainly, we think th at to be
within the exem ption the seller m ust acqu ire an interest in th e affairs
of the purchasing com p an y m ore definite than th at incident to ow ner
ship of its short term p urchase m oney notes.

Thus, under Pinellas, an exchange in order to be nontaxable cannot re
semble a sale. Consideration that will soon be translated into cash by
mere operation of time is, in effect, cash, and this circum stance removes
the excha n ge element required for a nontaxable reorganization.
The continuity-of-interest doctrine was further expanded in L eT u lle
v. Scofield, where a corporation transferred all its assets to another cor
poration for cash and the bonds of the transferee corporation.35 In hold
ing the transaction not to be a tax-free reorganization, the Supreme
Court stated the following:
W h ere the consideration is wholly in the tran sferee’s bonds, or p art
cash and p art such bonds, we think it cann ot be said th at the transferor
retains any proprietary interest in the enterprise. On the con trary, he
becom es a cred itor of th e tran sferee; and we do not think th at the fact
referred to by the C ircu it C ourt of A ppeals, th at the bonds w ere secured
solely by the assets transferred and th at, upon default, the bondholder
w ould retak e only the p rop erty sold, change his status from th at of a
cred itor to one having a proprietary stake within the purview of the
statu te. . . .

33. Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm., 60 F .2d 937 (2 d Cir. 1 9 3 2 ), 3 U.S. Tax Cas.
¶980.
34. Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Comm., 287 U.S. 462 (1 9 3 3 ), 3 U.S.
Tax Cas. ¶ 023.
35. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1 9 4 0 ), 4 0 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9150.
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The "Sound Business Purpose" Doctrine
Since the inception of the earliest reorganization provisions, the
nontaxable status of these transactions has been justified, at least in
part, on the theory that a business should be permitted, without ad 
verse tax effects, to make necessary and desirable changes that might
improve the existing form or structure of the enterprise or better enable
the business to m eet the changing demands of its operating environ
ment. The public-at-large was also deemed to benefit in that such ad 
justments could lead to more efficient operation of existing enterprises,
the elimination of unprofitable ventures, or the infusion of new capital
into sagging companies.
In the landmark decision of G regory v. H elvering, the Supreme
Court established the principle that taxpayers will be denied the tax
benefits of the reorganization provisions unless they can show, in addi
tion to meticulous compliance with the statute, that the transaction
serves a legitimate and genuine business purpose.36 Mrs. Gregory owned
all the shares of Old Corporation, which, in addition to its operating
assets, held appreciated stock in X Corporation. Gregory w anted to ob
tain the X stock, sell it, and keep the proceeds with minimum tax con
sequences. A direct distribution, whether of the stock itself or of the
proceeds from its sale, would have produced ordinary dividend income
equal to the value of X stock, as would a redemption of the Old stock
using the X stock as paym ent. A complete liquidation of the Old C or
poration would have yielded the desired tax result, but apparently the
parties did not wish to take such a drastic step.
In view of the shortcomings of these alternatives, the taxpayer and
her advisers cam e up with the following approach. New Corporation
was formed for the purpose of receiving the X stock from Old C orpora
tion, and in return for the X stock, New Corporation issued its New
shares to Gregory as the owner of the Old stock. Three days later, New
Corporation was dissolved, and Gregory received as a liquidating div
idend the X stock, which she sold. Gregory com puted her tax, using
preferential capital gain rates, on the difference between the value of
the X shares and the portion of the cost of the Old stock properly al
locable to the stock of New Corporation. This treatm ent was upheld
by the Board of Tax Appeals, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
and, later, the Supreme Court upheld the commissioner’s position that
the tax should be com puted upon the value of the X shares distributed
as a dividend.
After the G regory decision, taxpayers could no longer rely on mere
literal compliance with the statute in order to achieve a nontaxable re36. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1 9 3 5 ), 3 5 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9043, affg.
69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1 9 3 4 ), 1934 CCH ¶9180.
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organization. The tax-saving motive alone, unbolstered by a bona fide
intent to carry out genuine reorganization, was not sufficient to justify
the statutory exemptions. On the other hand, the mere existence of a
tax-saving motive would not serve to render an otherwise nontaxable
transaction taxable. The often-quoted circuit court opinion, delivered
by Judge Learned Hand, is perhaps one of the best descriptions of the
business purpose doctrine:
A transaction, otherwise within an exem ption of the tax law does not
lose its immunity, b ecause it is actu ated by a desire to avoid, or, if one
choose, to evade taxation. Anyone m ay so arrange his affairs th at his
taxes should be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose th at pattern
which will best pay the T reasu ry; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one’s taxes. . . . B u t underlying presum ption is plain th at the
readjustm ent shall be undertaken for reasons germ ane to the conduct
of the venture at hand, not as an ephem eral incident, egregious to its
prosecution. T o dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not one of the tran sac
tions con tem p lated as corp orate "Teorganization.”

Another aspect of the test of business purpose is whether the busi
ness purpose may reflect that of the shareholder as opposed to that of
the corporation. In Bazley v. Com m ., the court implied that the benefit
to the corporation must be direct and substantial.37 In more recent
cases, however, courts have held that a shareholder business purpose
would be sufficient ( other than merely a purpose to avoid ta x e s).38

The "Step Transaction" Doctrine
This judicial doctrine was developed and emphasized by the courts
to determine w hether a series of related transactions amounted to a re
organization. W hen there is a series of transactions that, if viewed
separately would give one tax result, but if viewed together would
yield another, different tax result, the question arises whether the steps
are interdependent or unrelated. If they are interdependent the courts
often state that an integrated transaction must not be broken into its
constituent steps or that the separate steps must be fused in determ in
ing the overall tax consequences of the transaction.39
37. Bazley v. Comm., 331 U.S. 737 (1 9 4 7 ), 4 7 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9288.
38. See Estate of Moses L. Parshelsky, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1 9 6 2 ), 6 2 -1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ¶9460 and Lewis v. Comm., 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1 9 4 9 ), 4 9 -2 U.S. Tax
Cas. ¶9377.
39. For illustrations of the multifaceted aspects of this principle, see Comm. v.
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1 9 6 8 ), 6 8 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9383; Helvering v. Elkhorn
Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1 9 3 8 ), 3 8 -1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9238; and American
Potash and Chemical Co. v. U.S., 185 Ct. Cl. 186 (1 9 6 8 ), 6 8 -2 U.S. Tax Cas.
¶9650.

61

The various anti-tax-avoidance doctrines often overlap. F o r exam 
ple, under the step transaction doctrine Mrs. Gregory’s “reorganization”
was clearly nothing more than a distribution of the X stock.

Current Reorganization Provisions
The tax-free reorganization is only one of several methods of a c 
quiring the stock or assets of a corporation. Alternatively, they may be
purchased, or they m ay be acquired in a stock redemption or in a co r
porate liquidation. The primary differences between a tax-free reorga
nization and a taxable acquisition are the ch aracter of the consideration
given by the acquiring corporation, and com pliance or noncompliance
with the statutory requirements of a reorganization. In a reorganiza
tion, the principal, if not the sole, consideration for the acquired stock
or properties is stock. In a reorganization, all or substantially all of a
corporation’s property or stock must be acquired, while the buyer in a
taxable transaction can be much more selective, acquiring only the de
sired assets and leaving any unwanted assets in the hands of the seller(s).
The tax results of a nontaxable reorganization are as follow s:40
1. Neither gain nor loss is recognized by the acquiring corporation.41
Property received by the acquiring corporation retains the basis it
had in the hands of the transferor, increased by the amount of gain,
if any, recognized by the transferor on the transfer.42 In some a c
quisition-type reorganizations, certain tax features of the acquired
corporation are carried over to the acquiring or “successor” corpora
tion under rules described later in this appendix.
2.

No gain or loss is recognized by the transferor corporation on the
exchange of property pursuant to a tax-free reorganization.43 But if,
in addition to the stock or securities of the acquiring corporation,
the transferor corporation receives boot in the exchange, gain, but
not loss, is recognized to the corporation unless the property is dis
tributed to its shareholders.44

40. A wide range of alternative methods is available for acquiring and disposing
of a corporate business. Selecting the appropriate method requires careful examina
tion and evaluation of the numerous tax and nontax factors associated with each
alternative. An excellent discussion of these important considerations is presented
in Zolman Cavitch, Tax Planning for Corporations and Shareholders (New York:
Matthew Bender, 1 9 7 7 ), Ch. 10.
41. Sec. 1 0 3 2 (a ).
42. Sec. 3 6 2 (b ).
43. Sec. 3 6 1 ( a ) .
44. Sec. 3 6 1 (b ).
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3.

Unless they receive boot in addition to stock or securities, no gain
or loss is generally recognized to the stock or security holders of the
corporations involved in the reorganization when they exchange
their stock and securities for those of another corporation.45 H ow 
ever, if a holder receives a larger principal amount of securities
(that is, long-term debt) than he surrenders, the fair market value
of the excess principal is treated as boot.46 If additional considera
tion is received, gain, but not loss, is recognized limited to the
money plus the fair m arket value of other property received, or the
realized gain, whichever is less.47 If the distribution has the effect
of a dividend distribution, any recognized gain is treated as a tax
able dividend to the extent of the recipient’s share of the corpora
tion’s accum ulated earnings and p r o f i t s . 48The remainder is treated
as gain from an exchange of property. The tax basis of the stock
and securities received by the holders pursuant to the reorganiza
tion will be the same as the basis of those surrendered, minus the
amount of cash and value of other property received, minus any
relief from, or assumption of, their liabilities, plus the amount of
any gain and dividend income recognized on the transaction.49

"Acquisition-Type" Reorganizations
T y p e A Reorganizations: Statutory M erger or Consolidation
A type A reorganization is the m erger or consolidation of two or
more corporations pursuant to the procedure set forth in the corporate
45. Sec. 3 5 4 (a ) ( 1 ) .
46. Secs. 3 5 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) and 3 5 6 (d ).
47. Sec. 3 5 6 (a ) ( 1 ) .
48. Sec. 3 5 6 (a ) ( 2 ) .
49. Sec. 358. These rules are illustrated in the following example: T, an individual,
exchanges stock he owns in A Corporation for stock in B Corporation plus $4,000
cash. The exchange is pursuant to a tax-free reorganization of A and B. T paid
$20,000 for the stock in A Corporation six years ago. The stock in B has a fair
market value of $24,000. T has a realized gain of $8,000 ($24 ,0 0 0 + $4,000 $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ), which is recognized to the extent of the “boot” received—$4,000. If the
distribution has the effect of a dividend, and if T ’s share of earnings and profits
in A is $1,000, then $1,000 of the recognized gain would be a taxable dividend.
The remaining $3,000 would be treated as a gain from the exchange of property.
T’s basis in the B stock would be $20,000 ($ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ( basis in stock surrendered) $4,000 ( boot received) + $4,000 ( gain and dividend income recognized) ) .
If T’s basis in the A stock had been $35,000, he would have a realized loss of
$7,000 on the exchange, none of which would be recognized. His basis in the B
stock would be $31,000 ($ 3 5 ,0 0 0 (basis in stock surrendered) - $4,000 (boot
received) ) .

63

law of the relevant state or states.50 The diff erence between the two
methods of combining corporations is one of form. In a merger, two or
more corporations are combined and one of the existing corporations
continues as the sam e legal entity. Thus, if M Corporation is merged
into O Corporation, M Corporation disappears in the transaction, but
O, the surviving corporation, continues with the combined businesses.
The shareholders of M receive stock or securities in O; the holdings of
the O shareholders are not changed. In a consolidation, two or more
existing corporations all disappear into a new corporation, which comes
into existence at the time of, and incident to, the consolidation pro
cedure. If P Corporation and Q Corporation, for example, are to be
combined by way of statutory consolidation, a new corporation, C or
poration R, will be created into which both P and Q will disappear.
The shareholders in both P and Q will receive stock or securities in R.
One of the chief advantages of a type A reorganization is that it
allows greater flexibility than other types of reorganizations because
the consideration need not be voting s t o c k . 51The “A” reorganization
thus permits money or other property to change hands without dis
qualifying the combination as a tax-free reorganization. Although the
money or other property will constitute boot and gain may have to be
recognized by the recipients, it will not prevent the transaction from
being a reorganization with the tax advantages and drawbacks de
scribed here (unless the stockholders of the disappearing corporation(s)
receive so much boot that they fail to meet the continuity-of-interest
test described above). The present position of the Internal Revenue
Service is that the continuity-of-interest test will be m et if the total
stock received by the shareholders of the disappearing corporation is
worth at least 50 percent of the total consideration received for all of
the outstanding stock of the disappearing corporation.52
There are also disadvantages to the type A reorganization. Full
com pliance with applicable state law is required. In many cases this
can cause problems. F o r example, in most states the shareholders of all
corporations participating in a m erger or consolidation are granted the

50. Sec. 3 6 8 (a)(1)(A ).
51. Voting stock is required in both type B and type C reorganizations, infra.
52. Rev. proc. 7 4 -2 6 , 1 9 7 4 -2 C.B. 478. Note that “it is not necessary that each
shareholder of the transferor, or acquired corporation receive in the exchange stock
of the acquiring or transferee corporation which is equal to at least 50 percent of
the value of his former stock interest in the acquired or transferor corporation,
so long as one or more of the shareholders of the acquired or transferor corpora
tion have a continuing interest through stock ownership of the acquiring or trans
feree corporation . . . which is, in the aggregate, equal in value to at least 50
percent of the value of all of the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired or
transferor corporation.”
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right to dissent and have their shares redeemed. The expenses of proxy
statements and special meetings of shareholders can run high.
Another im portant disadvantage of the type A reorganization is that
in most states, the surviving corporation assumes the liabilities, includ
ing contingent and unknown liabilities, of the acquired corporation as
a m atter of law.
Many of the problems associated with mergers and consolidations
can be reduced or eliminated if a subsidiary rather than its parent b e
comes the acquiring corporation. Causing a subsidiary to make the a c 
quisition protects the parent’s assets from the liabilities of the acquired
corporation. It usually has the further advantage of not requiring a
vote of the parent’s shareholders, since the parent itself is the sole
stockholder of the subsidiary. Consequently, only the approval of the
parent’s board of directors need be obtained. Although the subsidiary
could give its own stock in the transaction, the shareholders of the a c 
quired corporation usually want stock in the parent and the parent
prefers full ownership of its subsidiary.
Before 1968, a statutory merger into a subsidiary in exchange for
the parent’s stock did not qualify as a type A reorganization. Section
3 6 8 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( D ) now permits these “triangular” mergers provided that
the parent is in “control”
of the subsidiary, that no subsidiary stock
is used, and that the exchange would have been a type A reorganiza
tion if the m erger had been into the parent, as illustrated below.

M erger
Parent
Corporation

Acquired
Corporation
Alpha
Corporation

M erges into

Transfers stock
___ in Parent
Alpha’s
Shareholders
E n d up with
parent stock

Beta
Corporation
End s up with
Alpha's assets
and business

Alpha Corporation loses its
existence by operation o f law

53. Sec. 3 6 8 (c ) defines control as the ownership of at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least
80 percent of the number of shares of all other classes of stock.
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In 1971, section 3 6 8 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( E ) was enacted to treat a so-called “re
verse triangular” m erger as a reorganization. In such a merger, the a c 
quired corporation remains in existence, the subsidiary is m erged into
it, the acquired corporation’s shareholders receive parent stock, and the
acquired corporation becomes a subsidiary of the parent. To qualify
under this provision, the surviving acquired corporation must hold, in
addition to its own properties, substantially all of the m erged sub
sidiary’s properties, and the former shareholders must receive voting
stock of the controlling parent corporation in exchange for 80 percent
control of the surviving corporation, as illustrated below.

Reverse Merger
Voting Stock of Parent
Alpha’s
Shareholders

Parent
Corporation

Stock Representing
Control of Alpha

Alpha
Corporation

Substantially All
Beta’s Assets

Beta
Corporation

Beta Corporation loses its
existence by operation of law.
Alpha becomes subsidiary of Parent

T yp e B Reorganizations: Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions
The type B reorganization, generally used to create or perfect a
parent-subsidiary relationship, involves the acquisition by a corporation
of the stock of another corporation solely in exchange for its voting
stock or solely in exchange for the voting stock of a corporation in con
trol of the acquiring corporation. “Immediately after the acquisition,”
the acquiring corporation must be in control of the acquired corpora
tion. The solely-voting-stock requirement is strictly construed by the
c o u r t s . Thus,
45
no boot can be given in a type B reorganization.
The requirement that the acquiring corporation be in control of the
acquired corporation does not mean that the acquiring corporation
54. In Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 ( 1 9 4 2 ), 4 2 -1
U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9248, the Supreme Court asserted that the “solely” requirement
was added to the statute to assure that the reorganization provisions would not be
used as a method of “selling a business tax-free. . . . ‘Solely’ leaves no leeway.
Voting stock and some other consideration does not meet the statutory re
quirement.”
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must necessarily acquire 80 percent of the acquired corporation’s stock
in the transaction itself. Control need not be obtained through a single
transaction. A “creeping” acquisition will qualify, as well as an increase
in ownership by a corporation which already has control. Thus, if
X Corporation, in four successive and separate transactions, acquired
( solely for voting stock ) 20 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent, and finally
10 percent of the stock of Y Corporation, the last two exchanges would
qualify as type B reorganizations.
A problem arises when an earlier acquisition was made for a con
sideration other than voting stock, and then in a later transaction the
acquiring corporation obtains control using only its voting stock. To
illustrate, assume that, in January, Z Corporation acquires 20 percent
of the stock of Y Corporation for cash. In D ecem ber of the same year,
Z exchanges its voting stock for 60 percent of the Y stock and thereby
acquires 80 percent control. If the two transactions are independent of
one another, the requirements of a type B reorganization have been
satisfied and no gain or loss is recognized to the exchanging share
holders in the latter exchange. On the other hand, if both transactions
are p art of the sam e plan, they will be viewed as a single transaction
under the step transaction doctrine, and the cash consideration will dis
qualify the later exchange from nontaxability. The regulations permit
a prior cash purchase to be disregarded if it was independent of the
stock-for-stock exchange; but stock-for-stock acquisitions in a series are
to be aggregated if they occur “over a relatively short period of time
such as 12 months.”
The type B reorganization has the advantage of simplicity of form.
Its major disadvantages are that the consideration is limited to voting
stock and that the acquiring corporation cannot be sure that it will ob
tain 100 percent of the acquired corporation’s stock.
T yp e C Reorganizations: Stock-for-Asset Acquisitions
A type C reorganization is an acquisition by one corporation of sub
stantially all the properties of another corporation in exchange solely
for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent.56 In a
type C reorganization, the exchange of assets for stock by the acquired

55. Reg. sec. 1 .3 6 8 -2 (c ).
56. Sec. 3 6 8 (a )(1 )(C ). Consideration in the type C reorganization must nor
mally consist of voting stock, as in the type B reorganization. However, sec. 368 ( a )
(2 )(B ) permits the use of cash or other property as part consideration if at
least 80 percent of the fair market value of all property of the acquired corpora
tion is obtained through the use of voting stock. The assumption of the acquired
corporation’s liabilities is disregarded in determining whether the transaction is
“solely for voting stock,” but is treated as “other property” for the purpose of
applying the 80 percent test of section 3 6 8 (a )(2 )(B ).
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corporation will not be taxable to it. If, as is usually the case, the a c 
quired corporation is then liquidated pursuant to the plan of reorgani
zation, the receipt of the acquiring corporation’s stock by the acquired
corporation’s shareholders will be nontaxable to them as well.57 The
type C reorganization is distinguished from the type B in that the type
C involves the acquisition of the business of the acquired corporation,
rather than its stock.
The type C reorganization is similar to the type A. Although the
rules concerning consideration are more restrictive in the type C, this
latter method of acquisition is sometimes preferable to the type A. F o r
example, in the type C, unlike the type A, the acquiring corporation
can control w hat liabilities it chooses to assume. Thus, it can insulate
itself from the unknown or contingent liabilities of the acquired cor
poration, provided it is careful to comply with the various creditor pro
tection laws such as the “bulk sales” statutes. Another advantage of the
type C reorganization is that usually only the acquired corporation’s
shareholders need to vote on the plan and dissenter’s rights are avail
able only to them.
A disadvantage of the type G reorganization is that it requires the
acquisition of “substantially all” of the acquired corporation’s assets.
Many compliance problems develop in determining w hether this re
quirement has been satisfied where the acquiring corporation does not
w ant some of the assets of the acquired corporation. There are no
statutory guidelines for determining w hat constitutes “substantially all”;
the Internal Revenue Service requires that assets representing at least
90 percent of the fair market value of the net assets, and at least 70
percent of the fair m arket value of the gross assets, held by the a c
quired corporation be transferred to the acquiring corporation in order
for the parties to obtain a favorable ruling.58

Carryover of Tax Attributes
Section 381 provides an exception to the rule that only a corpora
tion’s own tax attributes and carryovers are available to it. In most a c 
quisition-type reorganizations in which assets are acquired, the acquir
ing corporation succeeds to the tax characteristics of the transferor
corporation. Section 381 requires successor corporations to take limited
carryovers of their predecessors’ tax benefits, privileges, elective rights,
and obligations when assets are acquired in specified tax-free reorgani-

57. Secs. 3 5 4 (a )(1 ) and 3 6 1 (a ).
58. Rev. proc. 7 4 -2 6 , 1 9 7 4 -2 C.B. 478.
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zations.59 Exam ples of these tax benefits and burdens are the net oper
ating loss carryforw ard of the acquired corporation, its capital loss
carryforw ard, accounting methods, depreciation methods, inventory
methods, unused charitable contribution deduction carryforwards, un
used investment credit carryforwards, and so forth. The carryover of
certain favorable items may be limited or even precluded under special
rules contained in sections 381 through 383 and section 269.

59, These carryovers apply in the following types of reorganizations:
1. A statutory merger or consolidation (type A ).

2 . A stock-for-assets acquisition ( type C ).
3. A type D reorganization (if substantially all the assets are acquired, and if
the transferor distributes all its remaining assets and the consideration received
from the transferee).
4. A mere change in identity, form, or place of organization ( type F ).
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